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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 There is a belief that the federal government is on the march in the corporate 
law realm. The common wisdom is that a reengaged federal government will, 
at least in some measure, preempt or otherwise regulate corporate matters tradi-
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tionally left to the states. It is evidenced by congressional action in the Sar-
banes-Oxley Act and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) initiatives.1 
It has spurred some in academia to recast the seemingly eternal race-to-the-
bottom/race-to-the-top state corporate law debate into a struggle between the 
federal government and Delaware.2 It has revealed itself in public hand-
wringing by Delaware authorities over the possibility, and undesirability, of 
their reduced role in corporate regulation.3 In short, it is a viewpoint that has 
become pervasive and consequential.4  
 This worldview is a myth—a bogeyman—when applied to the regulation of 
takeovers.5 Rather, since the late 1980s, the federal government has largely 
abandoned the takeover business.6 True, the SEC alone, and not Congress, has 
acted quite intermittently since that time to tweak and monitor existing laws and 
corporate conduct thereunder. But the SEC has not otherwise engaged in any 
significant rulemaking or otherwise involved itself in the takeover issues of 
the time. This is true of the periods both before and after the En-
ron/Worldcom scandals.7 
 The states, led almost exclusively by Delaware, have filled the SEC void, 
proceeding to oversee, refine, and create new takeover law. Takeover structures, 
tactics, and strategy have also shifted in response to Delaware’s continuing 
regulation and other market developments. The SEC, however, has not acted to up-
date the federal takeover rules to comport with this substantially altered landscape.  
                                                                                                                     
 1. See generally Faith Stevelman Kahn, Bombing Markets, Subverting the Rule of 
Law: Enron, Financial Fraud, and September 11, 2001, 76 TUL. L. REV. 1579 (2002) (trac-
ing the development of post-Enron/Worldcom federal reforms); Larry E. Ribstein, Market 
vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 
28 J. CORP. L. 1 (2002) (discussing the substantive parameters of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act). 
 2. See, e.g., Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Competition, 117 HARV. L. REV. 588 (2003) (ar-
guing that Delaware is the victor in the race for public corporate charters; its primary 
competition is now the federal government). 
 3. See, e.g., William B. Chandler III & Leo E. Strine, Jr., The New Federalism of the 
American Corporate Governance System: Preliminary Reflections of Two Residents of One 
Small State, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 953 (2003) (discussing the possibility and reality of federal 
intervention in corporate matters “traditionally” subject to state regulation); E. Norman 
Veasey, Musings from the Center of the Corporate Universe, 7 DEL. L. REV. 163, 163 (2004) (stat-
ing that “the Delaware franchise is fragile largely because of encroaching federalization”). 
 4. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Creeping Federalization of Corporate Law, 
REG. 26 (Spring 2003) (UCLA Sch. of Law, Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 03-
7), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=389403 (observing an increasing trend towards 
federalization of corporate law). The theme of an expansionary federal corporate law is not 
a new one. See, e.g., Arthur Fleischer, Jr., “Federal Corporation Law”: An Assessment, 78 HARV. 
L. REV. 1146 (1965) (observing and arguing for increased federal regulation of securities law). 
 5. For purposes of this Article, the term takeover refers to a transfer of corporate con-
trol either by way of tender offer or merger in a transaction or series of related transactions.   
 6. The academic community has also largely lost interest in federal takeover regula-
tion, and, since the late 1980s, writing on the subject has been limited and sporadic. Com-
pare this to prior periods when it was the “must-write” topic in corporate law. See David 
W. Leebron, Games Corporations Play: A Theory of Tender Offers, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 153, 
154 (1986) (“The nearly obligatory observation commencing any writing on the subject of 
tender offers is that no machination of the corporate or financial world has ever attracted 
greater attention from lawyers, legal scholars, financial economists, or the lay press.”). 
 7. See infra Part III (surveying the post-1980s SEC failure to regulate takeovers).  
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 The consequence, this Article argues, is that federal takeover law is cur-
rently outdated. It has become inapposite and unsuitable and otherwise fails to 
regulate today’s prototypical takeover. Today we have a federal takeover code 
that was enacted for a different time and circumstance—an age when the tender 
offer was newfound, poison pills8 and other takeover defenses nonexistent, and 
other federal takeover regulation, such as antitrust and national security review 
and waiting periods, virtually absent. This world is lost to time.9   
 The current federal takeover code should therefore, at a minimum, be up-
dated to meet this distinctly new takeover environment; but this Article argues 
for more. Mere tinkering and one-off rulemaking are insufficient. The magni-
tude of necessary revision, the piecemeal nature of the existent federal takeover 
regime, and the interconditionality and cross-dependency of takeover rules 
alone lead to the conclusion that a sweeping SEC-initiated review of federal 
takeover regulation is prudent if not essential. In arguing for this sea change, I 
do not advocate any particular federal takeover norm, merely the application of 
the SEC’s active voice and resources. Historical precedent dictates that any-
thing else should follow quite naturally.10    
 But one should not stop there. This Article further argues for the SEC’s re-
turn to its former role as the nation’s primary takeover regulator. This is a 
throne currently occupied by the Delaware courts.11 Yet this Article finds sub-
stantial evidence to support the public choice scholarship of Professor Mark J. 
Roe and others who argue that the interests of Delaware are narrower and more 
manager-oriented than the federal government’s.12 The takeover law produced 
by the Delaware courts in the SEC’s absence consequently reflects the state’s 
constricted interests; the code erected may be fine for Delaware but is not ap-
propriate for the diversity of national interests, let alone stockholders. The result 
is that today we have a Delaware-promulgated takeover code which entrenches 
management and increases agency costs to the detriment of economic efficiency 
and stockholder decisional autonomy.13   
                                                                                                                     
 8. For a description of the workings of a poison pill, see John C. Coates IV, Takeover 
Defenses in the Shadow of the Pill: A Critique of the Scientific Evidence, 79 TEX. L. REV. 
271, 287 n.62 (2000). 
 9. See infra Part V for further discussion of this temporal mismatch.  
 10. For a further discussion of the possible outcome of such a review, see infra Part VI.A. 
 11. Here I refer to both the Delaware Court of Chancery and its superior, the Dela-
ware Supreme Court. The Delaware Supreme Court authored the majority of decisions dis-
cussed in this Article. But the Delaware Supreme Court reviews only a small number of 
the takeover-related cases decided in the Court of Chancery, and it almost always affirms 
its lower court brethren. See Sean J. Griffith & Myron T. Steele, On Corporate Law Feder-
alism: Threatening the Thaumatrope, 61 BUS. LAW. 1, 10 (2005) (“The decisions of the 
Court of Chancery, when reviewed by the Delaware Supreme Court, are most often af-
firmed.”). Given the relative uniformity of decision-making, the two courts can effectively 
be considered a singular regulator, albeit with slight textual variance and occasional dis-
agreement. They are treated as such in this Article, with any relevant divergence noted.  
 12. See Mark J. Roe, Delaware’s Politics, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2491, 2498-2519 (2005). 
See also Brett H. McDonnell, Two Cheers for Corporate Law Federalism, 30 J. CORP. L. 99, 
132-38 (2004). 
 13. See infra notes 308-11 and accompanying text for a further discussion of this 
argument.  
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 Although this Article’s call for the federal takeover code’s reform should 
substantially ameliorate these deficits, these failings will quickly reappear if the 
SEC thereafter remains absent. The Delaware courts will revert to form, again 
engendering a suboptimal national takeover code. A reengaged SEC will tem-
per, if not stem, this consequence through the SEC’s ability to trump, or 
threaten to trump, Delaware law.14 It will also bring to bear the SEC’s resources 
and expertise, national rulemaking ability, congressional influence, and bully-
pulpit position. These are valuable benefits which the Delaware courts simply 
cannot institutionally provide.15 The result will be a more economic, relevant, 
and coherent national takeover code.  
 This Article is organized as follows. Part II of this Article highlights the 
SEC’s absence by delineating the SEC’s pre-1990s activity in promulgating 
takeover law and supervising and regulating takeovers.16 Part III highlights the 
SEC’s post-1989 disappearance as a takeover regulator. Part IV bookends this 
disappearing act by spelling out the continued rapid course of takeover regula-
tion as the Delaware courts supplanted the SEC as the nation’s primary takeover 
regulator. Part V then examines the failure of federal takeover law in light 
of the SEC’s bowing-out, ongoing state conduct, and the continued evolu-
tion of takeovers.  
 Part VI concludes with a call for an SEC-initiated review of the federal take-
over code and an active, engaged SEC as the principal regulator of takeover 
law. The Part also discusses the federalism issues raised by this proposal as well 
as its implications for the possibility and appropriateness of wholesale federali-
zation of the nation’s takeover code. Although myths can come true, this one 
should not come to pass. If the SEC is actively engaged, the Delaware courts 
and the SEC can together create and administer a synergistic national takeover 
code—one where each body regulates, administers, and collaborates on the 
takeover issues that correspond to their institutional strengths, albeit with the 
SEC in a de facto dominate position due to its preemptive ability. 
 Before beginning, an aside on what this Article does not address. This Arti-
cle is principally occupied with the SEC’s conduct, or lack thereof, and not 
Congress. Historically, Congress acted in corporate matters either at the SEC’s 
behest or, more notably, when scandal hit.17 For a recent example, recall the 
congressional furor over the proposed Dubai Ports acquisition.18 The SEC is the 
                                                                                                                     
 14. Roe, supra note 2, at 2498-99.  
 15. See infra Part VI.B for a detailed discussion of these comparative advantages.  
 16. Another myth is that the SEC was not an active participant in takeover regula-
tion during this time period. See JOEL SELIGMAN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 
589 (3d ed. 2003) (arguing that the SEC’s contribution to 1980s takeover regulation was 
largely “technical”).  
 17. See Stuart Banner, What Causes New Securities Regulation? 300 Years of Evi-
dence, 75 WASH. U. L.Q. 849 (1997) (arguing that new, large-scale federal securities regula-
tion is largely the product of scandal or other public furor). See generally Stephen M. Bain-
bridge, The Politics of Corporate Governance, 18 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 671, 699-710 
(1994-1995). 
 18. The congressional intervention in the acquisition of Peninsular & Oriental Steam 
by Dubai Ports and the ensuing political brawl which lead to Dubai Ports terminating the 
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primary federal regulator of the public takeover market. It has a duty to main-
tain its current regulation, engage in debate of topical and other issues, and pro-
pose new legislation to Congress when and where necessary. Congress acts in 
corporate and securities regulation sporadically at best; the SEC is by design 
potentially omnipresent. Accordingly, this Article largely concerns SEC con-
duct, not that of Congress.  
II.   THE GOLDEN AGE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION 
 This Part examines federal involvement in takeover regulation during the 
thirty-year period beginning in the 1960s.19 A well-respected commentator once 
described the SEC’s involvement in takeover regulation during this time as 
“quiescent.”20 This Part demonstrates that this is not the case. The SEC was in-
stead a significant, and sometimes leading, regulator of the period’s consequen-
tial takeover issues. Moreover, federal takeover regulation during this era was 
largely enacted or promulgated piecemeal, tailored narrowly to address the per-
ceived deficiencies of the time.21 These observations lay the bedrock for later 
analysis in this Article concerning the present-day efficacy of federal takeover 
regulation and the effect of the SEC’s subsequent disappearance.  
A.   The Williams Act (the 1960s) 
 Merger activity in the United States has historically occurred in waves. The 
“third wave” of U.S. merger activity transpired between 1960 and 1971 and was 
largely caused by that generation’s bubble, the conglomerate acquisition craze.22 
At the wave’s height, from 1967-69, over 10,000 companies were acquired, 
with approximately 25,000 firms disappearing throughout the entire period.23 It 
                                                                                                                     
U.S. component of its acquisition is reported in Mark A. Stein, A Big Deal Overshadowed 
by the Politics of Ports, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 11, 2006, at C2.  
 19. The goal is not a comprehensive review. This Article therefore excludes wholly 
from its discussion section 13(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, as amended (Ex-
change Act). Section 13(d), added to the Exchange Act by the Williams Act, mandates dis-
closure of beneficial ownership of more than five percent of a registered class of voting se-
curities within ten days after acquisition of such securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2000). It 
is an early-warning system with respect to potential unsolicited offers. See generally Peter 
G. Samuels, Schedules 13D and 13G: Reporting Beneficial Ownership of Registered Voting 
Securities, in SECURITIES FILINGS 2004, at 469 (PLI Corp. L. & Prac., Course Handbook 
Series No. 2749, Oct. 2004) (setting forth the disclosure and filing requirements of section 
13(d)). Though section 13(d) is not discussed herein, it has been a subject of extensive SEC 
rulemaking since its enactment, providing further evidence of the SEC’s regulatory promi-
nence in matters effecting takeovers.  
 20. SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 583. 
 21. See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Assaf Hamdani, Federal Corporate Law: Lessons from 
History, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1793, 1798 (2006). 
 22. MALCOLM SALTER & WOLF WEINHOLD, MERGER TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR THE 
1980’S (1980), reprinted in RONALD J. GILSON & BERNARD S. BLACK, THE LAW AND FINANCE 
OF CORPORATE ACQUISITIONS, at 12, 16-17 (2d ed. 1995). The first wave was from 1897-
1904 and consisted primarily of industry consolidating horizontal combinations. See 
PATRICK A. GAUGHAN, MERGERS, ACQUISITIONS, AND CORPORATE RESTRUCTURINGS 21-26 
(2d ed. 1999). The second wave was from 1916-1929 and largely produced oligopolies and 
consisted of vertical combinations. Id. at 26-30.  
 23. SALTER & WEINHOLD, supra note 22, at 17.  
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was in response to this flurry of activity and the consequent emergence of the 
cash tender offer that modern-day federal takeover regulation originated. Previ-
ously, takeovers were staid events conducted primarily through proxy solicita-
tions regulated by both state and federal proxy law.24 In the mid-1960s, how-
ever, at the crest of this third wave, there was a sharp comparative rise in unso-
licited or “hostile” takeover attempts.25 These unsolicited bidders typically pre-
ferred to evade the federal and state regulatory apparatus applicable to proxy 
contests and instead often made their takeover attempts via cash tender offer.26 
The rise of the tender offer is evidenced numerically: in 1966, there were over 
100 tender offers involving companies listed on national securities exchanges as 
contrasted with just eight in 1960.27 
 These early tender offers were largely unregulated affairs, and bidder con-
duct was often egregious.28 The “Saturday Night Special” was a favorite: in one 
form, a bidder would embark on a pre-offer buying raid to establish a substan-
tial beachhead of ownership at a reduced price.29 This would be followed by a 
short-period, first-come, first-served public tender offer.30 Disclosure by bidders 
in these offers was also cramped: target stockholders oftentimes did not know 
the bidder’s future intentions for the corporation, the source or availability of 
the bidder’s capital, or even the bidder’s true identity.31 In the wake of these 
new and unfamiliar tactics, stockholders and target corporations were relatively 
helpless. Takeover defenses at the time were in their infancy and virtually non-
                                                                                                                     
 24. See generally EDWARD ROSS ARANOW & HERBERT A. EINHORN, PROXY CONTESTS 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (2d ed. 1968). 
 25. There were 70 unsolicited takeover attempts in the period 1959-1962, compared to 
264 attempts in the period 1963-1967. DOUGLAS V. AUSTIN & JAY A. FISHMAN, 
CORPORATIONS IN CONFLICT—THE TENDER OFFER 12 (1970).  
 26. There were 29 unsolicited tender offers in the period 1959-1962, compared to 41 
proxy contests during this time. In the period 1963-1966, the number of unsolicited tender 
offers rose substantially to 115 tender offers, compared to 63 proxy contests during this 
time. Id. 
 27. S. COMM. ON BANKING AND CURRENCY, FULL DISCLOSURE OF EQUITY OWNERSHIP 
AND IN CORPORATE TAKEOVER BIDS, S. REP. NO. 90-550, at 2 (1967) [hereinafter SENATE 
REPORT]. The total value of cash tender offers similarly jumped from $186 million in 1960 
to $951 million in 1965. See Samuel L. Hayes, III & Russell A. Taussig, Tactics of Cash 
Takeover Bids, HARV. BUS. REV., Mar.-Apr. 1967, at 135, 136. 
 28. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-4. See generally Arthur Fleischer, Jr. & 
Robert H. Mundheim, Corporate Acquisition by Tender Offer, 115 U. PA. L. REV. 317, 326-
27 (1967).  
 29. The origin of the phrase “Saturday Night Special” is uncertain, but one version 
has it first employed in 1975, when a public relations executive used the term to malign 
Colt Industries’ unsolicited tender offer for Garlock. See GAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 42. 
An alternative account is that the term arose out of General Cable Corporation’s unsolic-
ited offer for Microdot, Inc. See Raymond S. Troubh, Purchased Affection: A Primer on 
Cash Tender Offers, HARV. BUS. REV., July-Aug. 1976, at 79, 86. 
 30. See Hugh L. Sowards & James S. Mofsky, Corporate Take-Over Bids: Gap in Fed-
eral Securities Regulation, 41 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 499, 500-04 (1967) (describing the typical 
form and structure of a “Saturday Night Special” tender offer).  
 31. See 113 CONG. REC. 859 (1967); SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 2-6.  
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existent.32 Indeed, when surveying takeover manuals published during this time 
period, one marvels at the breadth of subsequent developments.33  
 In light of the states’ failure to respond, the SEC became the principal gov-
ernmental actor in the drive to regulate cash tender offers. The SEC, led by its 
Chairman, Manuel F. Cohen, began a vocal campaign in favor of such regula-
tion and to spotlight abuse.34 The first fruits of the SEC’s labor were reaped in 
1965, when Senator Harrison A. Williams introduced a bill to regulate tender 
offers.35 This first bill, however, headlined in the Congressional Record with the 
portentous title “Protection Against Corporate Raiders,” had an avowedly anti-
takeover slant. It would, among other things, have required a twenty-day notice 
period before bidder commencement of a tender offer.36 The SEC, maintaining 
its activist approach, consequently took a public stance in opposition to many 
of the provisions of the bill, including the notice period.37 
 Largely because of this SEC opposition, in 1967 Senator Williams intro-
duced a revised, more neutral bill.38 One of its stated main purposes was “to 
avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of management or in fa-
vor of the person making the takeover bid.”39 The final bill, signed into law on 
                                                                                                                     
 32. Share repurchases and friendly share placements were the two prevalent takeover 
defenses. See generally David S. Bradshaw, Note, Defensive Tactics Employed by Incum-
bent Managements in Contesting Tender Offers, 21 STAN. L. REV. 1104 (1969) (describing 
various state-of-the-art takeover defenses circa 1969). In 1967, though, the Delaware 
courts circumscribed use of share placements by holding them invalid to the extent their 
primary purpose was to thwart an unsolicited offer. See Condec Corp. v. Lunkenheimer 
Co., 230 A.2d 769 (Del. Ch. 1967) (invalidating share issuance bestowing corporate control 
to one of the defendants where primary purpose was to prevent unsolicited tender offer). 
The Delaware courts were more tolerant of share repurchases, which were generally per-
missible under Delaware law at the time. See Cheff v. Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (Del. 
1964) (applying business judgment rule to uphold stock repurchase so long as it was not 
“solely or primarily because of the desire to perpetuate [the directors] in office”). 
 33. See, e.g., M. A. WEINBERG, TAKE-OVERS AND AMALGAMATIONS § 2404, at 270 (2d 
ed. 1967).  
 34. For example, Chairman Cohen, in the 1968 introduction to the second edition of a 
prominent treatise on proxy contests, publicly stated that unregulated cash tender offers 
were “getting away from us.” Manuel F. Cohen, Introduction to PROXY CONTESTS FOR 
CORPORATE CONTROL, supra note 24, at xvii. See also Manuel F. Cohen, A Note on Take-
over Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 BUS. LAW. 149 (1966); Manuel F. Cohen, 
Takeover Bids, in 2 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 87 (1966); Manuel F. Cohen, Chairman, 
SEC, Address Before the American Society of Corporate Secretaries, Inc., on Proposed Leg-
islation to Regulate Tender Offers (June 28, 1966), in WILLIAM W. BRATTON, CORPORATE 
FINANCE 1041-43 (5th ed. 2003). The SEC position was particularly noteworthy since there 
existed strong academic opinion in the period that tender offers were a beneficial force for 
corporate change and efficient allocation of resources and their regulation would be eco-
nomically detrimental. See, e.g., Henry G. Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares—A Reply 
to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE L.J. 231 (1967).  
 35. S. 2731, 89th Cong. § 2 (1965). 
 36. 111 CONG. REC. 28,257 (1965) (statement of Sen. Williams). 
 37. See SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, MEMORANDUM TO THE COMMITTEE ON BANKING AND 
CURRENCY, U.S. SENATE, reprinted in S. 2731, 112 CONG. REC. 19,003-06 (1966).  
 38. S. 510, 90th Cong. (1967).  
 39. SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 3.  
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July 29, 1968, and known as the Williams Act, was almost entirely in the form 
recommended by the SEC.40  
 The Williams Act itself both substantively and procedurally regulated tender 
offers, and its terms were keyed specifically to respond to the perceived abuses 
of the time.41 First, new section 14(d) obligated bidders to file on Schedule 14D 
and circulate a disclosure document in connection with a tender offer.42 Second, 
new section 14D attempted to curb coercive practices in tender offers by spell-
ing out substantive governing rules. More specifically, new section 14(d)(5) re-
quired a bidder to provide withdrawal rights during the first seven days of the 
offer and thereafter past the sixtieth day, effectively establishing a seven-day 
minimum offer period;43 new section 14(d)(6) required a bidder to accept shares 
tendered during the first ten days of a partial offer on a pro rata basis;44 and new 
section 14(d)(7) required a bidder to offer and pay the same consideration to all 
tendering stockholders.45 Finally, new section 14(e) prohibited misrepresenta-
tions, misleading omissions and “fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative acts or 
practices” in connection with a tender offer.46   
 The SEC had taken steps to regulate tender offers even before the adoption 
of the Williams Act. On May 28, 1968, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-4 prohibiting 
short tendering in connection with a partial tender offer.47 The SEC promul-
gated this rule after congressional statements in Williams Act hearings that the 
SEC had adequate authority to act.48 Thereafter, the SEC speedily moved to im-
                                                                                                                     
 40. Pub. L. No. 90-439, 82 Stat. 454 (1968). The SEC eventually had its way even with 
respect to points of initial divergence between it and Congress. For example, the SEC had 
recommended that the Williams Act require unlimited withdrawal rights prior to an offer’s 
close. Full Disclosure of Corporate Equity Ownership and in Corporate Takeover Bids: 
Hearing on S. 510 Before the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking and 
Currency, 90th Cong. 23 (1967). In the Williams Act, Congress provided for withdrawal 
rights only during the first seven days of an offer and thereafter past the sixtieth day. 15 
U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970). But the SEC later acted to steadily expand withdrawal rights to 
the entire tender offer period. See infra notes 84 and 153 and accompanying text. For a leg-
islative history of the Williams Act, see Lyman Johnson & David Millon, Misreading the 
Williams Act, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1862, 1891-95 (1989). 
 41. Here, I dispute commentators who have termed the Williams Act a weak regula-
tory response. The Williams Act addressed and regulated the significant concerns of the 
era. If anything, the Williams Act was viewed by commentators of the time as too strong a 
medicine.  See, e.g., Manne, supra note 34. It would only be later developments in take-
overs that would recast the Williams Act as a relatively weak legislative act.  
 42. 15 U.S.C. § 78(n)(d)(1) (1970). Schedule 14D attempted to remedy the information 
gap in tender offer practice by mandating disclosure of, inter alia, the bidder’s plans and 
proposals for the target, arrangements with any third party with respect to acquired target 
securities, source and amount of funds, background, and identity. Id.   
 43. Id. § 78n(d)(5). 
 44. Id. § 78n(d)(6). 
 45. Id. § 78n(d)(7). 
 46. Id. § 78(m)(e)(1).  
 47. Adoption of Rule 10b-4 under the Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act Release 
No. 8321, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,558 (May 28, 1968). 
Short tendering is the tender of securities into a partial offer that the tendering stock-
holder borrows and does not own. As a result, the number of shares purchased from the 
stockholder will increase and the number of shares purchased from other investors will be 
correspondingly reduced. Id. at 83,185. 
 48. SENATE REPORT, supra note 27, at 5. 
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plement the Williams Act and assume its oversight role of takeovers; within a 
few months of passage, the SEC adopted and then revised emergency imple-
menting Williams Act regulation.49 In the revising release, the SEC also put 
forth an expansive position on the scope of the Williams Act definition of a 
“tender offer.”50 On October 8, 1969, the SEC also adopted Rule 10b-13, which 
prohibited bidders, from the time of announcement of a tender offer, from pur-
chasing the security subject to the tender offer other than pursuant to that of-
fer.51  At the turn of the decade, and at the SEC’s behest, the Williams Act was 
amended by Congress.52 The amendments brought exchange offers within the 
Williams Act’s regulatory compass and provided the SEC with rulemaking au-
thority under section 14(e) “to deal with . . . rapidly changing problems.”53 The 
amendments also lowered the triggering threshold for the Williams Act’s sub-
stantive and procedural requirements from a tender offer for ten percent of a 
corporation’s equity to five percent.54  
 The framework for future regulation had been set, and the SEC had dived 
head-first into the takeover regulation business.  
B.   Going-Privates (the 1970s) 
 The third wave of merger activity subsided in the early 1970s with the pop-
ping of the conglomerate stock bubble and repeated U.S. economic recession.55 
These two events combined to birth the next major issue of takeover regulation: 
the abusive going-private.56 These were largely “take ‘em public high—buy ‘em 
                                                                                                                     
 49. The issued rules more specifically delineated tender offer disclosure and filing re-
quirements. Adoption of Temporary Rules and Regulations Under Sections 13(d) and (e) 
and Sections 14(d) and (f), Exchange Act Release No. 8370, [1967-1968 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,581 (July 30, 1968); Amendments to Temporary Rules and 
Regulations Under Sections 13(d) and (e) and 14(d), Exchange Act Release No. 8392, [1969-
1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,715 (Aug. 30, 1968) [hereinafter Au-
gust 1968 Amendments]. 
 50. The SEC stated that a special bid would thereafter be considered a tender offer 
subject to the Williams Act. August 1968 Amendments, supra note 49, at 83,638. A special 
bid was a procedure to permit the purchase of large blocks of stock through a fixed price 
bidding process. See Nathaniel B. Smith, Note, Defining “Tender Offer” Under the Williams 
Act, 53 BROOK. L. REV. 189, 198-99 (1987) (discussing special bids and their unregulated 
use prior to the SEC’s application of the Williams Act). 
 51. Adoption of Rule 10b-13 Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Exchange Act 
Release No. 8712, [1969-1970 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,745 (Oct. 8, 
1969) [hereinafter Rule 10b-13 Release]. Rule 10b-13 was proposed on the same day that 
the SEC adopted revised implementing regulations for the Williams Act. Notice of Pro-
posed New Rule 10b-13, Exchange Act Release No. 8391, [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] Fed. 
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 77,593 (Aug. 30, 1968). In 1999, Rule 10b-13 was amended and re-
designated as Rule 14e-5. Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications, 
Exchange Act Release No. 42055, [1999-2000 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
86,215, at 82,608 (Oct. 22, 1999) [hereinafter M&A Release].  
 52. Act of Dec. 22, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-567, 84 Stat. 1497. 
 53. 116 CONG. REC. 3024 (1970) (statement of Sen. Williams).  
 54. 15 U.S.C.A. § 78n(d)(1) (1971). 
 55. SALTER & WEINHOLD, supra note 22, at 18. 
 56. A going-private transaction, sometimes referred to as a freeze-out transaction, can 
be defined as a transaction where an affiliate of a publicly held corporation (for example, a 
member of management or a controlling or substantial stockholder) acquires, or causes to 
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out low” affairs; controlling affiliates of corporations who had only recently en-
gaged in initial public offerings when stock market prices were substantially 
higher offered to buy out their own publicly held stock at markedly lower 
prices.57 Because there was an inherently coercive element in these transactions 
and the opportune timing was at the affiliates’ discretion, these purchases en-
gendered cries of fraud and unjust enrichment.58 The states’ response was, at 
least initially, relatively sluggish,59 and the SEC again took the wheel maintain-
ing its role as the nation’s primary takeover regulator.60  
 In 1975, the SEC launched a fact-finding investigation and simultaneously 
proposed rules to govern going-private transactions.61 One form of the proposed 
rule would have required that a price paid in such a transaction be no lower than 
“the consideration recommended jointly by two qualified independent per-
sons.”62 Adoption of this rule was delayed, largely due to allegations that the 
SEC lacked rulemaking authority under the Williams Act.63 Then in 1977, the 
                                                                                                                     
be acquired, the corporation’s remaining publicly traded corporate equity. Consequently, 
the corporation becomes “private” and its equity is no longer publicly traded. See generally 
Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act Release 
No. 14185, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,366, at 88,737-38 
(Nov. 17, 1977) [hereinafter Going-Private Proposal Release]. 
 57. For an in-depth discussion of the legal controversy surrounding going-private 
transactions in the 1970s and the scope of claims arising therefrom, see id. at 88,736-39; 
see also Arthur M. Borden, Going Private—Old Tort, New Tort, or No Tort?, 49 N.Y.U. L. 
REV. 987 (1974). 
 58. There was a profuse amount of academic commentary at the time written on this 
issue. See, e.g., Borden, supra note 57; Victor Brudney, A Note on “Going Private,” 61 VA. L. 
REV. 1019 (1975); Victor Brudney & Marvin A. Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate 
Freezeouts, 87 YALE L.J. 1354 (1978); Edward F. Greene, Corporate Freeze-Out Mergers: A 
Proposed Analysis, 28 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1976); Edmund H. Kerr, Going Private: Adopting 
a Corporate Purpose Standard, 3 SEC. REG. L.J. 33 (1975); F. Hodge O’Neal & Ronald R. 
Janke, Utilizing Rule 10b-5 for Remedying Squeeze-Outs or Oppression of Minority Share-
holders, 16 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REV. 327 (1975); Anne Jentry, Note, The Developing Law 
of Corporate Freeze-Outs and Going Private, 7 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 431 (1976);  Note, Going 
Private, 84 YALE L.J. 903 (1975).  
 59. The only state to take legislative action was Wisconsin. 13 Wis. Admin. Code SEC 
§ 6.05(1)(a)1-3 (1978). The state court response was also tepid at first; these courts initially 
reviewed these transactions under a “business purpose” or a modified fairness test which 
often relegated minority stockholder claims to be remedied, if at all, through appraisal pro-
ceedings. This approach was deemed unsatisfactory by many critics. See generally Greene, 
supra note 58, at 496-506 (surveying the scope of state decisions prior to 1976 concerning 
going-private transactions). But see People v. Concord Fabrics, Inc., 371 N.Y.S.2d 550 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1975) (enjoining going-private transaction under New York law).  
 60. In a polemical speech made at Notre Dame law school, SEC Commissioner A.A. 
Sommer, Jr., initiated the SEC charge against going-private transactions. He labeled them 
as “serious, unfair, and sometimes disgraceful, a perversion of the whole process of public 
financing.” “Going-Private”: A Lesson in Corporate Responsibility, [1974-1975 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,010, at 84,695 (Nov. 20, 1974) (A. A. Sommer, Jr., 
SEC Commissioner, Address Before the Law Advisory Council Lecture at the Notre Dame 
Law School (Nov. 1974)). 
 61. Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation and Rulemaking Proceeding in the 
Matter of “Going Private” Transactions by Public Companies and Their Affiliates, Ex-
change Act Release No. 11231, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 
80,104 (Feb. 6, 1975). 
 62. Id. at 85,092. 
 63. See, e.g., Greene, supra note 59. 
2007]                      FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION 221 
 
Supreme Court in Santa Fe Industries v. Green64 overruled the Second Circuit’s 
holding that Rule 10b-5 constituted a basis to challenge a going-private decision 
on substantive grounds.65 This decision, and continued dissatisfaction with state 
regulation of going-privates—primarily the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision 
in Singer v. Magnavox Co.66—led the SEC to repropose rules.67 These rules 
were finally adopted by the SEC in 1979, and, although not as far-reaching as 
originally proposed, established a new disclosure-based regime for going-
privates.68 Most notably, the rules now obligated corporations in going-private 
transactions to express an opinion as to the “fairness” of the transaction to unaf-
filiated stockholders.69 The SEC conduct was particularly noteworthy given the 
view of many that it did not have the legal authority to adopt even this scaled-
back regulation.70  
 The other major takeover issue of this decade concerned the scope of the 
Williams Act. The Williams Act regulated tender offers, but intentionally did 
not define what constituted a tender offer triggering the Act’s substantive and 
procedural requirements.71 Not surprisingly, in light of this uncertainty, bidders 
repeatedly structured their purchases so as to claim that they did not constitute 
tender offers.72 But the SEC was quite energetic in establishing an expansive 
view of this definition and consequent reach of the Williams Act.73 Immediately 
                                                                                                                     
 64. 430 U.S. 462 (1977). 
 65. Id. at 474-76.  
 66. 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977). In Singer, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a go-
ing-private transaction must have a valid business purpose. A transaction “made for the 
sole purpose of freezing out minority stockholders” lacked such purpose and therefore was 
“an abuse of the corporate process.” Id. at 980. The court further held that even if a valid 
business purpose was existent, a Delaware court should still “scrutinize the circumstances 
for compliance with the . . . rule of ‘entire fairness’ . . . .” Id. at 979-80. Though it did not 
succeed, Singer was arguably Delaware’s attempt to forestall SEC rulemaking and was in 
reaction to the SEC’s heated criticism of going-privates. See GILSON & BLACK, supra note 
22, at 1256 n.40 (arguing that Singer was a response to “political considerations”).  
 67. Going-Private Proposal Release, supra note 56. 
 68. Going Private Transactions by Public Companies or Their Affiliates, Exchange Act 
Release No. 16075, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,166 (Aug. 2, 1979) 
[hereinafter Going-Private Adopting Release].  
 69. Id. at 82,130.  
 70. See generally Mary-Ellen Hunt, Comment, An Appraisal of Authority for the Fair-
ness Standard Contained in the SEC’s Proposed “Going-Private”’ Regulations, 28 EMORY 
L.J. 111 (1979) (noting criticism of the SEC’s statutory authority to regulate going-private 
transactions). The SEC devoted a substantial portion of the Going-Private Proposal Re-
lease to justify the proposed going-private regulations as within its rulemaking authority. 
Going-Private Proposal Release, supra note 56, at 88,740-44. In doing so, the SEC quoted 
the testimony of Thomas G. Corcoran, one of the authors of the Williams Act, to claim that 
the Williams Act “was broadly framed to protect investors ‘from exploitation by corporate 
insiders.’ ” Id. at 88,741. This marked a significant step afar from the neutrality vis-à-vis 
targets and bidders that the SEC had proclaimed in the Williams Act hearings. 
 71. See Note, The Developing Meaning of “Tender Offer” Under the Securities Ex-
change Act of 1934, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1250, 1250 (1973). 
 72. See generally Thomas J. André, Jr., Unconventional Offers Under the Williams 
Act: The Case for Judicial Restraint, 11 J. CORP. L. 499 (1986) (outlining various types of 
unconventional purchases potentially outside the scope of the Williams Act).  
 73. See Note, supra note 71, at 1261-70 (outlining SEC attempts to establish an ex-
pansive Williams Act definition of tender offer). 
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upon passage of the Williams Act the SEC published its position on the defini-
tional scope of a tender offer. Then in 1974, the SEC released a notice of a fact-
finding investigation to consider issuance of a regulatory definition of a tender 
offer under the Williams Act.74 After hearings, the SEC announced that such a 
rule was neither “appropriate nor necessary” at that time; rather, abstention 
would preserve SEC flexibility to respond to developments in transaction types 
that are or should be encompassed by the term.75 For the remainder of the 
1970s, the SEC largely pursued its quest in the courts, achieving a measure of 
success when its eight-factor broad definitional test for a tender offer was 
adopted in the 1979 case of Wellman v. Dickinson.76  Shortly afterwards, the 
SEC attempted to capitalize on this victory by again proposing regulation and 
legislation further enlarging the tender offer definition to encompass unconven-
tional purchases such as purchases outside the temporal offer period.77 None of 
these proposals, however, resulted in new regulation or law.  
 The SEC was also acting during this time to refine and broaden the require-
ments of the Williams Act. On September 9, 1974, the SEC initiated an investi-
gatory proceeding “to develop a factual basis for determining whether it is nec-
essary or appropriate . . . to adopt or amend rules, . . . and/or to recommend fur-
ther legislation” concerning takeovers and acquisitions.78 On August 2, 1976, 
the SEC proposed a wholesale revision to the takeover code based on the find-
                                                                                                                     
 74. Notice of Public Fact-Finding Investigation in the Matter of Beneficial Ownership, 
Takeovers and Acquisitions by Foreign and Domestic Persons, Exchange Act Release No. 
11003, [1974-1975 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 79,956 (Sept. 9, 1974) [here-
inafter 1974 Fact-Finding Release]. 
 75. Tender Offers—Notice of Proposed Rules and Schedules, Exchange Act Release 
No. 12676, [1976-1977 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 80,659, at 86,696 (Aug. 
2, 1976) [hereinafter 1976 Tender Offer Release].  
 76. 475 F. Supp. 783 (S.D.N.Y. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 682 F.2d 355 (2d Cir. 
1982). Wellman adopted a broad-based, eight-factor test proposed by the SEC itself to de-
termine if a stock purchase or series of purchases constituted a tender offer. Id. at 823-24. 
The standard annunciated in Wellman quickly became the judicial norm for determination 
of a tender offer under the Williams Act. See generally Smith, supra note 50, at 201-09 
(discussing the Wellman test and its adoption by courts in subsequent cases).  
 77. See Proposed Bill to Amend Williams Act, reprinted in 542 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. 
(BNA) 20 (Special Supplement Feb. 27, 1980); Proposed Tender Offer Rules and Schedule, 
Exchange Act Release No. 15548, [1979 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,935, 
at 81,229-31 (Feb. 5, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Proposed Rules and Schedule Release] (pub-
lishing for comment proposed tender offer definition); Proposed Amendments to Tender Of-
fer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 16385, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 
(CCH) ¶ 82,374 (Nov. 29, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Proposed Rules Release] (withdrawing 
tender offer definition proposed in 1979 Proposed Rules and Schedule Release and propos-
ing a new definition); Letter from SEC Chairman Harold M. Williams to Senator William 
Proxmire, reprinted in Tender Offer Legislation Proposed [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,453 (Feb. 15, 1980) (proposing tender offer definition encom-
passing any acquisition of ten percent of a class of equity securities). See generally André, 
supra note 72, at 529-33 (discussing the substantive scope of each of the foregoing defini-
tional proposals); James H. Fogelson et al., Changing the Takeover Game: The Securities 
and Exchange Commission’s Proposed Amendments to the Williams Act, 17 HARV. J. ON 
LEGIS. 409 (1980) (reviewing the SEC’s legislative recommendations for defining a tender 
offer under the Williams Act).  
 78. 1974 Fact-Finding Release, supra note 74, at 84,461. 
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ings of this investigatory proceeding.79 These proposed rules would not be 
adopted, but would form the basis for later rulemaking.80 On July 21, 1977, the 
SEC finally adopted permanent disclosure requirements for Schedule 14D “to 
replace its emergency rules under the Williams Act” and as part of an effort to 
adopt a “comprehensive regulatory framework with respect to tender offers.”81 
In 1979, on the same day it adopted going-private rules, the SEC also promul-
gated rules for the governance of issuer tender offers similar to those for third 
party offers.82  
 The SEC finished out the decade by substantially revising the Williams Act 
rules to principally adopt the 1976 proposed rules.83 The SEC changes effec-
tively eliminated all vestiges of the old “Saturday Night Special” for any and all 
tender offers: new Rule 14e-1 lengthened the minimum offering period to 
twenty business days from the de facto seven calendar days required by old 
Rule 14d-5.84 Other rules set forth procedures for bidders to compel targets to 
mail the bidder’s tender offer materials to target stockholders or otherwise pro-
vide the necessary stockholder information for mailing by the bidder itself—an 
alternative to state statutes increasingly perceived as deficient.85 Finally, re-
weighing the state/federal takeover regulatory scales, the SEC also promulgated 
Rule 14d-2, which required that an offer commence within five business days of 
announcement.86 This SEC action was telling; it directly and intentionally pre-
empted emergent state regulation mandating conflicting pre-approval or waiting 
periods before commencement of a takeover bid.87 In this last deed, the SEC 
had taken steps to reassert definitively its authority over takeover regulation.  
 The SEC thus continued its heightened involvement in takeover regulation 
throughout the 1970s, acting vigorously during this time to preserve its position 
                                                                                                                     
 79. 1976 Tender Offer Release, supra note 75. 
 80. 1979 Proposed Rules and Schedule Release, supra note 77, at 81,207 (withdrawing 
the 1976 Tender Offer Release and publishing for comment certain proposed rules and a 
related schedule pertaining to tender offers).  
 81. Filing and Disclosure Requirements Related to Tender Offer, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 13787, [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 81,256, at 88,372 
(July 21, 1977). 
 82. Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release No. 16112, [1979 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,182 (Aug. 16, 1979). 
 83. Tender Offers, Exchange Act Release No. 16,384, [1979-1980 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,373 (Nov. 29, 1979) [hereinafter 1979 Tender Offer Release]. 
 84. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 (1980). Under amended Rule 14d-7, withdrawal rights were 
extended to an initial fifteen business day period with an additional ten business day 
withdrawal period required if a competing offer was commenced under certain conditions. 
Id. § 240.14d-7. Rule 14d-8 now permitted bidders to vary the acceptance period for partial 
offers and extend withdrawal rights for a duration longer than the seven days required by 
Rule 14d-6. Id. § 240.14d-8. 
 85. 1979 Tender Offer Release, supra note 83, at 82,586-89. This rule was again an act 
by the SEC in the face of criticism that its rulemaking was beyond its authority. Id. at 
82,587.  
 86. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-2. 
 87. 1979 Tender Offer Release, supra note 83, at 82,583-84. The federal courts acted 
definitively to adopt the SEC’s position, quickly overturning on preemption grounds con-
flicting state takeover statutes. See, e.g., Canadian Pac. Enters. (U.S.) v. Krouse, 506 F. 
Supp. 1192 (S.D. Ohio 1981) (holding Ohio takeover regulation requiring precommence-
ment period of twenty days to be preempted by SEC Rule 14d-2).  
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as the nation’s regulator of takeovers and supplant state takeover law where it 
deemed appropriate.  
C.   Hostile Takeovers (the 1980s) 
 The fourth wave of takeover activity commenced in the late 1970s and early 
1980s and ended in 1989 in the wake of the collapse of the high-yield bond 
market and the S&L scandal. The heightened activity was again quantitatively 
marked: the annual value of acquisition transactions rose from $43.5 billion in 
1979 to a peak of $246.9 billion in 1988 before bottoming out at $71 billion in 
1991.88 Unsolicited takeover activity, mainly cash tender offers, sharply in-
creased from twelve contested tender offers in 1980 to forty-six such offers in 
1988,89 the increase juiced by cheap financing in the form of high-yield bonds.90 
But this wave was different in one significant respect: this time targets were 
equipped for defense. The fourth wave was notable for the wide-spread target 
resort to takeover defenses, including such colorfully named measures as poison 
pills, shark repellents, pac-mans, golden parachutes, and greenmail.91 The re-
newed vigor of targets, as well as revised bidder tactics, would spur a revolution 
in takeover methodology, resulting in more extended public takeover battles 
and leading state courts, state legislatures, Congress, federal courts, and the 
SEC to confront this phenomenon. The SEC again particularly met this chal-
lenge. Although the SEC’s involvement in takeover regulation during this pe-
riod was extensive and reached high tide, the SEC arguably failed to meet many 
of its annunciated goals. The remainder of this Part illustrates the breadth of 
SEC involvement by briefly highlighting three of the main SEC efforts during 
this era.92    
                                                                                                                     
 88. SALTER & WEINHOLD, supra note 22, at 32. 
 89. GAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 42. The activity was also pervasive, and during this 
time period thirty percent of the corporations in the Fortune 500 were subject to unsolic-
ited takeovers. See Gerald F. Davis & Suzanne K. Stout, Organization Theory and the 
Market for Corporate Control: A Dynamic Analysis of the Characteristics of Large Takeover 
Targets, 1980-90, 37 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 605, 608 (1992). 
 90. Laurence Zuckerman, Shades of the Go-Go 80’s: Takeovers in a Comeback, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 3, 1994, at A1. The high yield or “junk” bond market expanded exponentially 
from $7 billion in 1970 to $146 billion in 1988, the increase due mainly to use of this fi-
nancing in corporate control transactions. Charles M. Nathan & Eric A. Lopez Sr., Hedge 
Funds and M&A—New Sharks and Too Little Shark Repellant, in SECURITIES 
REGULATION IN EUROPE: A CONTRAST IN EU & US PROVISIONS 515, 521 (PLI Corp. Law and 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 6100, Dec. 2005). 
 91. For definitions of each of these, see generally Richard S. Ruback, An Overview of 
Takeover Defenses, in MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 49 (Alan J.  Auerbach ed., 1988).  
 92. One could literally write a book, and quite a juicy one at that, on this period or 
even its individual events. See, e.g., BRYAN BURROUGH & JOHN HELYAR, BARBARIANS AT 
THE GATE: THE FALL OF RJR NABISCO (2003) (chronicling the takeover battle for RJR Na-
bisco in 1988); ALLAN SLOAN, THREE PLUS ONE EQUALS BILLIONS: THE BENDIX-MARTIN 
MARIETTA WAR (1983) (chronicling the takeover battle between Bendix and Martin-
Marietta in 1982). But I have selected for discussion in this Part three of the more telling 
examples during the period of SEC takeover regulation and activity.   
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1.   SEC Legislative and Regulatory Efforts 
 The first of these efforts was the SEC’s continued attempts to revise and ex-
pand the reach of the Williams Act. In 1983, the SEC formed an Advisory 
Committee on Tender Offers93 (Advisory Committee) comprised of eighteen 
prominent members of the takeover community.94 The Advisory Committee 
promptly reported fifty recommended revisions to federal takeover regulation in 
June of that year.95 In March of 1984, the SEC Commissioners considered the 
recommendations; the SEC Commissioners rejected the sweeping ones, includ-
ing a prohibition on charter and bylaw amendments which erected “high barri-
ers to change of control.”96 Nonetheless, the SEC Commissioners did accept the 
majority of recommendations.97 The rationale for the SEC Commissioners’ re-
jection of a bar on takeover defenses particularly was never explained. How-
ever, the Delaware and other state courts had not yet ruled on the validity of 
these defenses, and the SEC’s forbearance could be attributed to a wait-and-see 
approach with respect to this possible state action.98 In May of that year, the 
SEC proposed implementing legislation for the accepted recommendations, in-
cluding legislative curbs on greenmail and golden parachutes.99    
 But events of the fourth wave soon forced the SEC to refocus its modest leg-
islative agenda. By 1985, the rise of unsolicited takeovers in the public con-
sciousness, and the negative public perceptions thereof, led to active congres-
sional interest.100 In that year alone, forty-one bills proposing to regulate take-
                                                                                                                     
 93.  Advisory Committee on Tender Offers Establishment and Meeting, Exchange Act 
Release No. 19528, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,319 (Feb. 24, 
1983). 
 94. See generally SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at 584-85 (describing the history and 
composition of the committee).  
 95. SEC Advisory Committee on Tender Offers, Report of Recommendations and 
Commission Positions (July 8, 1983), reprinted in TENDER OFFERS 30-43 (Marc I. Steinberg 
ed., 1985) [hereinafter Advisory Committee Report].  
 96. See Statement of John S.R. Shad, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Concerning the Recommendation of the SEC Advisory Committee on Tender 
Offers, [1983-1984 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,511, at 86,681 (Mar. 28, 
1984) [hereinafter SEC Advisory Committee Response]. For example, the SEC stated that 
it had serious reservations concerning Recommendation 14, which would require any ac-
quisition of more than twenty percent of the voting power of a corporation be acquired from 
the corporation itself or pursuant to a tender offer. Id. at 86,679-81.  
 97. The SEC Commissioners proposed legislation for five of the recommendations, 
agreed to support pending congressional legislation on golden parachutes, and ordered the 
SEC staff to take rulemaking action with respect to fourteen other recommendations. Id. at 
86,684. See generally Linda C. Quinn & David B.H. Martin, Jr., The SEC Advisory Com-
mittee on Tender Offers and Its Aftermath—A New Chapter in Change-of-Control Regula-
tion, in TENDER OFFERS, supra note 95, at 21-25 (outlining the SEC’s response to the Advi-
sory Committee Report). 
 98. The SEC Commissioners stated that they shared the “serious concerns” of the Ad-
visory Committee but were “not prepared at this time to concur in such a broad intrusion 
into state corporate law.” SEC Advisory Committee Response, supra note 96, at 86,681.  
 99. Tender Offer Reform Act of 1984, H.R. 5693, 98th Cong. (1984). The bill was sub-
mitted by the SEC to Congress on May 21, 1984, and introduced on May 22, 1984. 
 100. See, e.g., Peter Behr, Inside the Economy, WASH. POST, Jan. 5, 1984, at D9 (dis-
cussing increasing public concern over unsolicited takeovers and consequent proposals for 
regulation). 
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overs were introduced in Congress101—compared to one bill in 1980.102 These 
bills largely sought to tip takeover regulation in favor of targets by permitting 
takeover defenses and limiting bidder conduct.103 The SEC opposed these bills. 
Instead, the SEC favored minority legislation preserving a level playing field 
and stockholder choice, increasingly calling for limits or even preemption of 
certain antitakeover measures such as the poison pill.104 Even the SEC’s own 
1984 bill became caught in the storm; in 1985 it was amended into its opposite, 
an antitakeover law.105 The SEC promptly committed filicide by issuing a public 
statement opposing these protarget amendments and killing its own proposed 
legislation.106 In the end, the SEC’s active energies would not produce passage 
of a takeover bill it favored, but, aided in large part by the Reagan Administra-
tion, the SEC would maintain the status quo and help defeat the proposed anti-
takeover legislation.107  
 Legislative revision and initiative potential largely lost, the SEC attempted 
to respond and strengthen the Williams Act through regulatory action.108 In 
1986, in retort to a number of adverse court decisions, the SEC issued a concept 
release concerning the definitional scope of a tender offer, namely “whether the 
Williams Act should apply whenever a person acquires a substantial percentage 
of a target company’s securities during or shortly after a tender offer.”109 The 
                                                                                                                     
 101. Roberta Romano, The Future of Hostile Takeovers: Legislation and Public Opin-
ion, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 457, 470-71 (1988). 
 102. Id.   
 103. See, e.g., S. 286, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 631, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 706, 99th Cong. 
(1985); S. 860, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 1882, 99th Cong. (1985); S. 1907, 99th Cong. (1985); 
H.R. 1480, 99th Cong. (1985); H.R. 5694, 98th Cong. (1984). 
 104. See The Battle over Tender Offer Reform: From the States and the Courts to Con-
gress, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 60 (Jan. 15, 1988) (reviewing the SEC position during 
the period on proposed congressional tender offer legislation). 
 105. These amendments would have required a bidder to file a community impact 
statement, extended the minimum tender offer period to forty calendar days, and elimi-
nated restrictions on management ability to take defensive action. See Tender Offer Re-
form Act of 1984, supra note 99.  
 106. See SEC Says It Opposes House Measure to Restrict Abusive Takeover Tactics, 16 
Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1473-74 (Sept. 14, 1984). The Reagan Administration also came 
out in strong opposition to the bill. See Reagan Administration Formally Opposes House 
Bill to Limit Tender Offer Abuses, 16 Sec. Reg. & Law Rep. (BNA) 1546 (Sept. 28, 1984). 
The Reagan Administration’s position was distinct from the SEC’s opposition. Secretary of 
the Treasury Donald Regan objected to the Bill on deregulatory and federalism bases writ-
ing that the Bill “ ‘intrude[s] unnecessarily into state law and constitute[s] an unwarranted 
step toward imposition of a substantive federal corporation law.’ ” Id. 
 107. See Subcomm. on Annual Review, Annual Review of Federal Securities Regula-
tion, 40 BUS. LAW. 997, 1016-23 (1985) (outlining SEC and Reagan Administration opposi-
tion to proposed congressional takeover legislation). Congress did eventually act to inhibit 
the use of greenmail and golden parachutes by imposing excise taxes on their use. I.R.C. §§ 
162(k), 280G (1988).  
 108. See, e.g., Commission Will Not Reintroduce Takeover Legislation Package, Shad 
Says, 17 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 573 (Apr. 5, 1985). The only other major takeover re-
form bill of the decade reported out of congressional committee was the Tender Offer Re-
form Act of 1987; it restricted greenmail and golden parachutes and would have required 
stockholder approval of certain takeover defenses. Tender Offer Reform Act of 1987, H.R. 
2172, 100th Cong. (1987). It, too, died in Congress.  
 109. Concept Release on Takeovers and Contests for Corporate Control: Advance No-
tice of Possible Commission Actions, Exchange Act Release No. 23486, [1986-1987 Transfer 
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next year the SEC proposed rules to regulate such purchases, but, as with other 
regulatory initiatives on this issue, these rules were never adopted.110 Interest-
ingly, in the concept release, the SEC for the first time contemplated economic 
deregulation of tender offers, requesting for comment upon but never respond-
ing to the question of whether the Commission should adopt “a self-governance 
exemption to . . . provisions of its tender offer regulations.”111  
 Meanwhile, the SEC was also using its regulatory powers to reconsider ex-
isting rules. In 1984, the SEC Commission, after considering deregulation of 
short tendering, decided to amend Rule 10b-4, over one dissent, to wholly ban 
hedged tendering.112 In 1986, the SEC also amended the proxy disclosure rules 
to raise the disclosure obligations with respect to acquisition transactions.113 Fi-
nally and also in that year, the SEC amended the rules governing issuer tender 
offers to harmonize them with the third party tender offer rules and address cer-
tain controversial practices by targets in defensive buy-backs.114  
2.   Antitakeover Measures 
 The second mainstay SEC effort during this era was its increasing vocal and 
active opposition to the use of antitakeover measures. As the fourth wave pro-
gressed, states enacted antitakeover statutes and target corporations increasingly 
resorted to antitakeover defenses. In response, the SEC took a progressively 
more public position that corporate, judicial and legislative actions permitting 
or implementing antitakeover measures diminished stockholder choice and were 
therefore unacceptable.115  
a.   Poison Pills 
 The first prong of the SEC’s campaign was its active opposition to the adop-
tion of antitakeover devices by corporations. The SEC initially raised this issue 
in 1979; the SEC stated publicly that it “[was] becoming increasingly concerned 
by the effect of defensive corporate charter amendments on the interests of in-
                                                                                                                     
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,018, at 88,199 (July 31, 1986) [hereinafter 1986 Con-
cept Release]. 
 110. Acquisitions of Substantial Amounts of Securities and Related Activities Under-
taken During and Following a Tender Offer for Those Securities, Exchange Act Release No. 
24976, [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,160 (Oct. 1, 1987). These rules 
were likely not finalized due to widespread adoption of the poison pill and its inhibiting ef-
fect on these purchases, rendering the need for regulation largely unnecessary.  
 111. 1986 Concept Release, supra note 109, at 88,200. 
 112. Short Tendering Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 20799, [1984 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶83,601, at 86,712-13 (Mar. 29, 1984) [hereinafter Short Tendering 
Release]. For a definition of hedged tendering, see Robert F. Kramer, Securities Exchange 
Act Rule 10b-4: The Second Circuit Considers Whether Short and Hedged Tendering Are 
Manipulative Devices, 54 BROOK. L. REV. 649, 649 (1988).  
 113. Proxy Rules—Comprehensive Review, Exchange Act Release No. 22195, [1985-
1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,901 (July 1, 1985).  
 114. Tender Offers by Issuers, Exchange Act Release 22788, [1985-1986 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,954 (Jan. 14, 1986).  
 115. See infra Part II.C.2.a.  
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vestors, particularly investors who are confronted with a tender offer.”116 This 
concern transformed into active opposition as the decade progressed and their 
use became widespread. I have already noted the SEC’s mid-1980s legislative 
proposals and support of congressional action to stem the use of greenmail and 
golden parachutes. But the SEC also pursued this cause through the regulatory 
process and the courts, particularly focusing on the bête noire of the age, the 
poison pill invented by Marty Lipton in 1982.117  
 The focus of the SEC’s judicial strategy was primarily an argument to ban 
poison pills in Delaware state court in the 1985 case of Moran v. Household 
Int’l, Inc.118 The SEC effort, however, was unsuccessful, and the court in Moran 
validated use of the poison pill as a proportional target defensive response.119 
Thereafter, the SEC unabashedly persisted in its campaign. In 1986, the SEC 
published a study of poison pills by its Chief Economist finding that “poison 
pills are harmful to target shareholders, on net [and there is] no statistical evi-
dence that pills have systematically benefited target shareholders.”120 Thereaf-
ter, the SEC requested public comment on a rule which would have required 
stockholder preapproval of poison pills.121 The SEC abandoned this proposed 
rule shortly thereafter. The SEC’s stated reason was that, due to substantial 
resolution of investor concerns surrounding these defenses by the state courts, 
regulation was not appropriate at the time.122  
                                                                                                                     
 116. 1979 Proposed Rules Release, supra note 77, at 82,614.  
 117. Lipton purportedly conceived of the poison pill to aid El Paso Railroad in fending 
off an unsolicited offer by Burlington & Northern Railroad. See Guhan Subramanian, A 
New Takeover Defense Mechanism: Using an Equal Treatment Agreement as an Alternative 
to the Poison Pill, 23 DEL. J. CORP. L. 375, 397 n.128 (1998).  The SEC during this time pe-
riod also attempted to prohibit dual-class voting stock which was claimed to unduly in-
fringe upon the fundamental corporate concept of one-share-one-vote and preclude take-
overs. The SEC responded in 1988 by promulgating Rule 19C-4, which prohibited publicly 
listed corporations from maintaining dual-class stock. This rule was invalidated by the 
D.C. Circuit on the grounds that it was beyond the SEC’s rulemaking authority under sec-
tion 19(c) of the Exchange Act. See Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407 (D.C. Cir. 
1990). See generally Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 
19C-4, 69 WASH. U. L.Q. 565 (1991).   
 118. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985). The SEC filed an amicus brief in Moran. Id. at 1348.  
The SEC’s decision to intervene was made on a three to two vote by the SEC Commission-
ers. Id. at 1348 n.1. The SEC argued that a “[b]oard is unauthorized to usurp stockholders’ 
rights to receive hostile tender offers” and “unauthorized to fundamentally restrict stock-
holders’ rights to conduct a proxy contest.” Id. at 1351.  See generally Martin M. Cohen, 
Note, “Poison Pills” as a Negotiating Tool: Seeking a Cease-Fire in the Corporate Takeover 
Wars, 1987 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 459, 471-77 (1987) (discussing the SEC’s intervention in 
Moran).  
 119. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1353-56.  
 120. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE EFFECTS OF POISON PILLS ON THE 
WEALTH OF TARGET SHAREHOLDERS 43 (1986). These results were consistent with an ear-
lier study by the SEC Chief Economist. See A Study on the Economics of Poison Pills 
[1985-1986 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,971, at 88,044 (Mar. 5, 1986) 
(concluding that the “effect[s] of poison pills [in deterring] prospective hostile takeover bids 
out-weighs the beneficial effects that come from increased bargaining leverage of the target 
management”).  
 121. 1986 Concept Release, supra note 109, at 88,206.  
 122. See Tender Offer Reform, Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Telecommunications 
and Finance of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. (1987) (statement of 
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 Here, the SEC was likely referring not to Moran but to two revolutionary 
Delaware Court decisions. In 1985, the Delaware Supreme Court decided Uno-
cal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.123 and Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes 
Holdings.124 Unocal and Revlon were uniquely consequential for holding that 
the takeover decision and the use of takeover defenses would now be reviewed 
by the Delaware courts under a higher standard than the business judgment 
rule.125 Though these decisions left undefined the initial parameters of this re-
view and its limitations, they initially appeared to circumscribe the use of take-
over defenses—hence, the SEC’s forbearance. For the remainder of the 1980s, 
the Delaware courts would be an active regulator of takeovers through exposition 
and application of these two decisions and their required standards of review.126  
b.   State Takeover Legislation 
 The second prong of the SEC offense was its consistent opposition to state 
takeover legislation. In the mid-1970s, the states began to stir and legislate their 
own takeover laws.127 These first generation statutes were almost all patterned 
upon blue sky laws and went beyond the Williams Act. In their most common 
form, these laws subjected a takeover offer to a precommencement waiting pe-
                                                                                                                     
David S. Ruder, Chairman, Securities and Exchange Commission). The SEC action was 
also likely causally related to congressional and even administration opposition to such a 
proposal. For example, the Reagan Administration’s Economic Policy Council came out 
forcefully during this time period against congressional action to prohibit takeover de-
fenses. Administration Group Rejects Proposal to Enter Debate on Corporate Takeovers, 
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 819 (June 5, 1987). 
 123. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). In Unocal, the Delaware Supreme Court held that a tar-
get board decision to take defensive action in light of a threat to the corporation—in this 
case an unsolicited two-tiered takeover offer combined with the threat of greenmail—
should not be reviewed under the business judgment rule but rather a higher, intermedi-
ate standard. Id. at 955. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Delaware’s 
Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Substance to Proportionality Re-
view?, 44 BUS. LAW. 247 (1989) (reviewing the Unocal decision and Delaware courts’ sub-
sequent interpretation thereof). 
 124. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon case is discussed further at infra Part IV.A.  
 125. See Sean J. Griffith, Good Faith Business Judgment: A Theory of Rhetoric in Cor-
porate Law Jurisprudence, 55 DUKE L.J. 1, 61-63 (2005) (stating that “the creation of Rev-
lon duties shifted the frontier of the authority/accountability spectrum in favor of greater 
board accountability to courts”); Robert A. Prentice & John H. Langmore, Hostile Tender 
Offers and the “Nancy Reagan Defense”: May Target Boards “Just Say No”? Should They 
Be Allowed To?, 15 DEL. J. CORP. L. 377, 383-85 (1990) (discussing Revlon’s and Unocal’s 
raised standards of review with respect to takeover defenses).  
 126.  For example, in the 1980s, the Delaware Court of Chancery held in six cases that 
a board’s responsive action in the face of a takeover bid was disproportionate under Uno-
cal. See Grand Metro. Pub. Ltd. v. Pillsbury Co., 558 A.2d 1049 (Del. Ch. 1988); City Capi-
tal Assocs. v. Interco Inc., 551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Ev-
ans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988); Tate & Lyle PLC v. Staley Cont’l, Inc., Civ. A. No. 
9813, 1988 WL 46064 (Del. Ch. May 9, 1988); I.P. Phillips v. Insituform of N. Am., Inc., 
Civ. A. No. 9173, 1987 WL 16285 (Del. Ch. Aug. 27, 1987); AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Ander-
son, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103 (Del. Ch. 1986).  
 127. See generally Diane S. Wilner & Craig A. Landy, The Tender Trap: State Takeover 
Statutes and Their Constitutionality, 45 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 3 (1976) (observing in 1976 
that twenty-three states had recently enacted takeover statutes). Delaware enacted a first 
generation statute on May 1, 1976. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203(c)(2) (1977). 
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riod and approval by a state administrator.128 I have already noted that the SEC 
had acted in 1979 to preempt a number of these statutes.129 But, as the fourth 
wave gathered steam, the number of state legislatures adopting takeover statutes 
increased in response to heightened public hostility to takeovers mixed with 
opportune corporate lobbying.130 The SEC vocally and continually opposed 
this legislation as against its level-playing-field policy as well as on the 
grounds that these laws were either preempted or an unconstitutional burden 
on interstate commerce.131  
 In the Supreme Court case Edgar v. MITE Corp.,132 the SEC succeeded: Illi-
nois’ first generation takeover statute was struck down as unconstitutional.133 
However, the states quickly counterattacked, enacting modified and more lim-
ited second generation takeover statutes.134 The content of these statutes was 
less far-reaching than first generation laws; they purported to regulate corporate 
internal affairs, such as stockholder or board approval procedures, rather than 
the exogenous matter of the takeover process.135 In CTS Corp. v. Dynamics 
Corp. of America,136 the Supreme Court set back this SEC effort by holding 
Indiana’s second generation law to be constitutional.137 Within six months of 
                                                                                                                     
 128. See generally Donald C. Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation: Interests, Ef-
fects, and Political Competency, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 213, 219-33 (1977) (describing first 
generation takeover laws). 
 129. See supra notes 86-87 and accompanying text. 
 130. By 1982, thirty-seven states had adopted a form of takeover statute. These stat-
utes are listed in Mark A. Sargent, On the Validity of State Takeover Regulation: State Re-
sponses to MITE and Kidwell, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 689, 690 n.7 (1981).  
 131. The SEC had consistently opposed this regulation since its first appearance in the 
1970s. See Wilner & Landy, supra note 127 (reviewing early state takeover statutes and 
arguments that they “frustrated” the purposes of the Williams Act and “unconstitutionally” 
burdened interstate commerce). 
 132. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
 133. Id. at 646. The SEC filed an amicus brief in MITE asserting that the statute was 
constitutionally infirm because it alternatively violated the commerce clause or was pre-
empted by the Williams Act. Brief for the Securities and Exchange Commission as Amicus 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S 624 (1982) (No. 80-1188), 
1981 WL 389721. 
 134. In the six-year period after MITE, twenty states enacted takeover statutes. 
Romano, supra note 101, at 461. See also Allen D. Boyer, Federalism and Corporation Law: 
Drawing the Line in State Takeover Regulation, 47 OHIO ST. L.J. 1037, 1062-65 (1986) 
(tracing state reactions to the decision in MITE and their passage of second generation 
takeover laws).  
 135. Second generation statutes had a more confined jurisdictional scope: they limited 
their application to corporations organized within the state. In addition, they almost al-
ways had opt-out or opt-in provisions which permitted corporate choice as to whether to 
apply the statute. See generally Roberta Romano, The Political Economy of Takeover Stat-
utes, 73 VA. L. REV. 111, 113-17 (1987) (describing the types of takeover statute and setting 
forth states adopting them).  
 136. 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
 137. Id. at 94. The SEC also filed an amicus brief in CTS Corp. In contrast to its 
amicus brief in MITE, the SEC argued that the statute was constitutionally invalid under 
the commerce clause but did not reargue invalidity under preemption doctrine. Brief for 
the Securities and Exchange Commission and the United States as Amici Curiae Support-
ing Respondents, CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S 69 (1987) (Nos. 86-71 & 86-
97), 1987 WL 880969. 
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CTS, fifteen states proceeded to enact some species of these laws.138 Impor-
tantly, the post-CTS wave included a second generation law enacted by Dela-
ware which, over SEC public objection, passed a business combination statute 
modeled on New York’s.139 
 Nonetheless, the SEC continued its aggressive prosecution of its unconstitu-
tionality claims vis-à-vis these new second generation laws. The SEC attitude 
during this time was summed up by the SEC General Counsel Daniel Goelzer, 
who stated in 1988, 
[T]he [C]ommission has instructed us to support challenges to the 
constitutionality of the Delaware [antitakeover] statute . . . . I 
identified that as a top priority because our success or failure in 
those challenges will have a far[-]reaching effect on tender offer 
practice and quite likely on what Congress does with respect to 
tender offer legislation.140 
In line with this testimony, the SEC actively argued in amicus filings in state 
courts to declare state takeover statutes unconstitutional, including the Delaware 
law referred to in the quote above. These efforts were wholly unsuccessful.141 
The SEC Chairman at the time, David S. Ruder, also went before Congress and 
futilely attempted to prod it into passing legislation providing the SEC with au-
thority to preempt state takeover laws.142 While the SEC ultimately failed in its 
endeavor to restrict takeover defenses and preempt state takeover statutes, it could 
not be denied that the SEC had unreservedly made an attempt and, at least par-
tially, succeeded in limiting the effects and scope of state takeover statutes.143  
                                                                                                                     
 138. David F. Crabtree, Note, The Constitutionality of State Takeover Legislation Re-
visited: The Effect of CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 1988 UTAH L. REV. 675, 679 
n.23 (1988).  
 139. The Delaware law was a relatively modest version of takeover law, a fact possibly 
attributable to vocal SEC lobbying against Delaware’s adoption of any takeover statute. 
See Romano, supra note 101, at 463-65. 
 140. Major Change in Direction Under Debate in SEC Bankruptcy Program, Goelzer 
Says, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1171, 1176 (July 22, 1988). The SEC campaign gener-
ally extended against all species of takeover statute. See, e.g., Joseph Grundfest, Letter to 
the Honorable Mario M. Cuomo, reprinted in GILSON & BLACK, supra note 22, at 1392-93 
(letter from the SEC Commissioner to the Governor of New York arguing against the adop-
tion by New York state of an antitakeover constituency statute).  
 141. For example, the SEC subsequently filed amicus briefs in three federal district 
court cases arguing that the takeover statutes before the court in each instance were un-
constitutional on commerce clause and preemption grounds. See RP Acquisition Corp. v. 
Staley Continental, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 476 (D. Del. 1988); Salant Acquisition Corp. v. Man-
hattan Indus., 682 F. Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1988); RTE Corp. v. Mark IV Industries, 1988 
WL 75453 (E.D. Wis. May 6, 1988). See also Johnson & Millon, supra note 40, at 1882-86 
(discussing the SEC amicus curiae briefs in these cases). 
 142. The SEC’s position was largely opposed by other members of the Reagan admini-
stration. See Witnesses at Takeover Bill Hearing Split on Preemption of State Regulation, 
19 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 851 (June 12, 1987). 
 143. This failure with respect to takeover defenses, however, was complete. By the end 
of the 1980s, almost every publicly traded corporation had adopted one or more antitake-
over devices. See INVESTOR RESP. RES. CTR. INC., CORPORATE TAKEOVER DEFENSES 1989 
(Virginia K. Rosenbaum ed., 1989). 
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3.   Specific SEC Action 
 The third of the SEC’s efforts consisted of actions to address two of the 
more prevalent and problematic takeover tactics in the fourth wave—the two-
tiered tender offer144 and the exclusionary self-tender.145 As the fourth wave con-
tinued, the SEC acted with respect to the two-tiered offer: on December 15, 
1982, the SEC revised Rule 14d-8 to extend the minimum proration period for 
partial tender offers to twenty business days.146 This SEC action was again an 
aggressive one, illustrated by the dissent of the SEC Chairman and another 
commissioner who argued that the new rules were ultra vires since they con-
flicted with the plain language of section 14(d)(6) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, as amended (Exchange Act).147 The SEC subsequently and repeat-
edly acted to place the issue of two-tiered offers in the public realm by issuing a 
notice of possible commission action148 and then releasing a study by the Chief 
Economist of the SEC finding that two-tiered offers largely had no adverse ef-
fects.149 Ultimately, however, the SEC never attempted to further regulate two-
                                                                                                                     
 144. In its most common form, the front-loaded, two-tiered tender offer involved two 
steps. First, the bidder would initiate a tender offer to acquire a controlling interest in the 
target. The consideration in this first step would typically be cash. Thereafter, in the sec-
ond step the bidder would “freeze-out” the minority interest and acquire the remaining 
target shares through a compulsory acquisition process. In this second step, the considera-
tion would sometimes be securities with a lower value than the initial cash consideration 
offered. See generally Comment, Front-End Loaded Tender Offers: The Application of Fed-
eral and State Law to an Innovative Corporate Acquisition Technique, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 
389, 390-94 (1982) (describing a typical two-tiered offer in the context of the competitive 
bidding by U.S. Steel and Mobil for Marathon Oil). The coercive element is self-evident: in 
the absence of takeover defenses, stockholders are incentivized to tender into the offer so 
as to ensure receipt of the certain value of the cash consideration. See generally Lucian 
Arye Bebchuk, Toward Undistorted Choice and Equal Treatment in Corporate Takeovers, 
98 HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1717-35 (1985) (describing the coercive nature of two-tiered tender 
offers). 
 145. The exclusionary self-tender is a defensive tactic: the target launches a self-tender 
offer for its shares at a price that is a premium to market but which, by its terms, prohibits 
the hostile bidder from tendering into this offer. An exclusionary self-tender can be par-
ticularly effective in the face of a front-loaded, two-tiered tender offer because it provides 
an alternative to target stockholders and ostensibly compensates these stockholders for a 
lower back-end in the bidder’s offer. See Kenneth B. Pollock, Note, Exclusionary Tender Of-
fers: A Reasonably Formulated Takeover Defense or a Discriminatory Attempt to Retain 
Control?, 20 GA. L. REV. 627, 633-41 (1986) (describing the use of an exclusionary self-
tender offer by Unocal in the face of an unsolicited offer by Mesa Petroleum).   
 146. Pro Rata Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 19336, [1982-1983 Transfer Binder] 
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,306 (Dec. 15, 1982). 
 147. Id. at 85,652 (dissent of SEC Commissioner John Shad). See also W. Brewster 
Lee, III, Note, SEC Tender Offer Timing Rules: Upsetting a Congressionally Selected Bal-
ance, 68 CORNELL L. REV. 914 (1983) (arguing that the SEC promulgation of Rule 14d-8 
was beyond the scope of its statutory rulemaking authority).  
 148. See Two-Tier Tender Offer Pricing and Non-Tender Offer Purchase Programs—
Advance Notice of Possible Commission Action, Exchange Act Release No. 21079, [1984 
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,637 (June 21, 1984).  
 149. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ECONOMIST, SEC, THE ECONOMICS OF ANY-OR-ALL, PARTIAL, 
AND TWO-TIER TENDER OFFERS (1985).   
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tiered offers, as the rise of the poison pill anesthetized their coercive element 
and constrained their use by bidders.150  
 In contrast, the SEC acted definitively with respect to the exclusionary self-
tender. When the Delaware Supreme Court in Unocal upheld an exclusionary 
self-tender in the face of an unsolicited bid for Unocal Corp. by the well-known 
corporate raider T. Boone Pickens, the SEC took direct action on the all-holders 
rule it had previously contemplated in 1979. In 1986, the SEC amended Rules 
14d-10 and 13e-4 to include an all-holders rule and a revised best-price rule.151 
The new all-holders rule was specifically enacted to overturn the Delaware rul-
ing by prohibiting exclusionary issuer and third party tender offers of any na-
ture.152 Notably, this release also amended Rule 14d-7 to provide for withdrawal 
rights throughout the entire tender offer period.153  
D.   Federal Takeover Regulation Circa 1989 
 Things were different as the sun set on the 1980s. The regulation of take-
overs in the 1960s had been the SEC’s untrammeled domain. In 1968, the year 
of the Williams Act, Virginia was the only state with a takeover statute.154 Addi-
tionally, state courts at that time only sporadically addressed takeover issues 
and treated them largely as if they were any other general corporate matter, 
typically applying the business judgment rule and its “hands off” imprimatur to 
scrutinize these takeover-related decisions.155 But by the close of the 1980s, 
takeover regulation in the United States was a duopoly of the states and the 
SEC. Interestingly, the state component was now principally the state courts 
rather than the legislatures. Although second and later generation takeover stat-
utes had been enacted by the state legislatures,156 the substantive regulation and 
                                                                                                                     
 150. See Coates, supra note 8, at 321. 
 151. Amendments to Tender Offer Rules—All-Holders and Best-Price, Exchange Act 
Release No. 23421, [1986-1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 84,016 (July 11, 
1986) [hereinafter All-Holders Release].  
 152. Proposed Amendments to Tender Offer Rules, Exchange Act Release No. 22198, 
[1984-1985 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 83,797, at 87,560 (July 1, 1985). 
The all-holders rule was controversial and once again viewed by some commentators as be-
yond the SEC’s rulemaking authority. All-Holders Release, supra note 151, at 88,188-91. 
See generally Roberta S. Karmel, Authority for the Tender Offer Rules, 216 N.Y. L.J. 3 (Dec. 
19, 1996) (noting SEC authority to promulgate Rules 14d-10 and 13e-4 was sternly ques-
tioned during the rulemaking process).  
 153. All-Holders Release, supra note 151, at 88,196-97. The SEC also amended Rules 
13e-4(f)(1)(ii) and 14e-1(b) to require that the tender offer period remain open for ten busi-
ness days after the announcement of an increase or decrease in the percentage of securities 
being sought or in the consideration offered. Id. at 88,195-96.  
 154. The Virginia takeover statute was enacted shortly before the passage of the Wil-
liams Act on March 5, 1968. See Martin Lipton & Paul K. Rowe, Pills, Polls and Professors: 
A Reply to Professor Gilson, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 4 n.11 (2002).  
 155. See generally Edward F. Greene & James J. Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Current 
Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 711 (1984) (stating that 
“[s]tate regulation, however, is not likely to be effective [to regulate takeovers] because the 
business judgment rule is the method used to review those corporate actions”).  
 156. See Arthur R. Pinto, The Constitution and the Market for Corporate Control: State 
Takeover Statutes After CTS Corp., 29 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699, 713-16 (1988) (discussing 
the states’ adoption of takeover statutes post-CTS Corp.). 
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state administrative oversight embedded in first generation takeover statutes had 
been left by the wayside. These new statutes merely set forth procedural anti-
takeover strictures to be adhered to by the takeover participants and enforced by 
the state courts.157 The state courts, by weaving a web of heightened takeover 
standards, went much further—placing themselves in a permanent supervisory 
position over takeovers.158 Accordingly, by the end of the 1980s, takeover regu-
lation was largely the province of the SEC and the state courts, principally 
Delaware.159 
 This overlapping jurisdiction and regulation created an uneasy marriage. In 
broad terms, the SEC regulation primarily controlled disclosure and the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of the tender offer process itself. Meanwhile, 
state law promulgated by the courts controlled the corporate decision-making 
process: the so-called internal affairs doctrine.160  But, as discussed above, there 
was much conflict and overlap among the two. For example, both the SEC and 
state courts actively sought to regulate or considered regulation of takeover de-
fenses, going-privates and exclusionary self-tenders.161 Meanwhile, the inter-
weave of state and federal regulation of proxy contests foreclosed categoriza-
tion between the two.162 In short, while the regulatory focus was divergent, there 
was no clear demarcation of role between the two actors, and, if anything, the 
federal component was dominant.163 In light of this overlap, the 1980s finished 
with both the SEC and state courts actively competing to regulate almost every 
aspect of the takeover.  
                                                                                                                     
 157. See id.  
 158. See supra Part II.C.2.  
 159. Cf. Lyman Johnson, The Delaware Judiciary and the Meaning of Corporate Life 
and Corporate Law, 68 TEX. L. REV. 865, 872-73 (1990) (“Therefore, not only has the task of 
speaking to the takeover phenomenon centered on state rather than federal forums, the 
true locus of power has shifted from the legislative branch to the Delaware judiciary.”). 
 160. The internal affairs doctrine is a conflict of laws principle that leaves matters of 
internal corporate governance to be regulated by the state that charters the corporation. In 
the realm of takeovers, the application of the principle has always been on shaky doctrinal 
ground. Where internal affairs (to be regulated by the chartering state) and third party, 
extra-corporate affairs (to be regulated by other states and possibly the federal govern-
ment) begin and end is murky. See, e.g., Jed Rubenfeld, State Takeover Legislation and the 
Commerce Clause: The “Foreign” Corporations Problem, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 355, 379-80 
(1988). The Supreme Court itself noted this problem in MITE, stating that “[the internal 
affairs] doctrine is of little use . . . in this context. Tender offers contemplate transfers of 
stock by stockholders to a third party and do not themselves implicate the internal affairs 
of the target company.” Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 645 (1982).  
 161. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.  
 162. State and federal law, as well as stock exchange rules, have historically combined 
without distinction to control both the substantive and procedural aspects of proxy con-
tests. See generally RANDALL S. THOMAS ET AL., ARANOW & EINHORN ON PROXY CONTESTS 
FOR CORPORATE CONTROL (3d ed. 1998).   
 163. See Richard W. Painter, Responding to a False Alarm: Federal Preemption of State 
Securities Fraud Causes of Action, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 15 (1999) (“Congress’s regulation 
of tender offers under the Williams Act represents the closest that it has come to encroach-
ing on substantive corporate law . . . .”); Robert B. Thompson, Preemption and Federalism 
in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue, 62 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 215, 242 (1999) (“The relationship between shareholders and directors 
within a corporation, long thought to be within the domain of state law, now has a domi-
nant federal aspect.”). 
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 Moreover, the revolution in bidder and target tactics and accompanying 
market developments transformed the takeover. The takeover of the 1980s was 
a very different animal than that of the 1960s. Two-tiered and partial offers us-
ing differing mixes of securities and cash were common, in contrast to the al-
most uniform use of the cash tender offer in the 1960s. Unsolicited offers and 
leveraged structures utilizing high-yield financing also became prevalent. The 
big difference, however, was that targets could now respond with defensive 
measures and thereby inhibit, if not preclude, an unsolicited takeover.164 This 
was true despite the fact that targets were now subject to review under higher 
state court standards, leading many an unsolicited takeover to be decided in the 
courts.165 This state court review, which typically validated target defensive ac-
tion, placed the state courts in the role of umpire in the takeover game and ef-
fectively further slowed the pace of takeovers.166 
 Meanwhile, on the federal level, the SEC had erected a scaffold of rules 
generally applicable to takeover transactions and special regulation applicable 
to issuer tender offers and going-private transactions. These rules largely fol-
lowed the long-held SEC positions of neutrality vis-à-vis targets and bidders 
and protection of the common stockholder.167 However, other congressional leg-
islation in the 1970s was not so neutral in its effect. The Hart-Scott-Rodino An-
titrust Improvements Act of 1976 enacted an antitrust waiting and review period 
for acquisition transactions, including tender offers.168 The 1988 Exon-Florio 
Amendment to the Defense Production Act of 1950 also established a timeline 
for review of acquisition transactions affecting national security.169 The result 
was to put a federal brake on the ability of many a bidder to swiftly consum-
mate a tender offer or otherwise take preliminary acquisition measures.  
 Finally, the Williams Act marked the first and last coordinated piece of sys-
tem-wide federal takeover regulation. Thereafter, the SEC promulgated take-
over regulation largely in response to issues as they arose. The SEC did not, in 
this process, develop a principle-based approach to regulation—adopting gen-
eral guidelines applicable to differing paradigms and unforeseen developments. 
Rather, the SEC issued regulation on a case-by-case basis keyed to specific 
                                                                                                                     
 164. This was primarily due to the availability of the poison pill. See, e.g., Guhan 
Subramanian, Fixing Freezeouts, 115 YALE L.J. 2, 49 (2005) (“However, in practice, the 
poison pill makes board approval a prerequisite even for tender offers.”). 
 165. Professor David Skeel has noted that Delaware, in its quest to maintain its role as 
the epicenter of takeover regulation, has “taken numerous steps” to encourage such litiga-
tion to be sited in Delaware. See David A. Skeel, Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware 
Corporate Law, 83 VA. L. REV. 127, 160 (1997).  
 166. See generally Peter J. Henning, Corporate Law After the Eighties: Reflections on 
the Relationship Between Management, Shareholders and Stakeholders, 36 ST. LOUIS U. 
L.J. 519, 613 (1992). 
 167. The SEC has generally observed neutrality in this regard, but as Professor Donald 
Langevoort has observed, the SEC has above all favored the average stockholder in its 
takeover regulation, introducing a “primary objective of egalitarianism.” Donald C. 
Langevoort, The SEC as a Bureaucracy: Public Choice, Institutional Rhetoric, and the 
Process of Policy Formulation, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 527, 535 (1990).  
 168. Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1390 (1976).  
 169. Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1425, et seq. (1988). 
236  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:211 
 
problems.170 The federal takeover code was thus one cobbled together from 
various pieces.  
 The one constant through all of this was the SEC. During this period, the 
SEC sometimes appeared schizophrenic in its regulatory goals and pronounce-
ments.171 The SEC also often failed to implement its legislative, regulatory, and 
enforcement agenda. This is certain. But it is also clear that during this period 
the SEC, although not omnipotent, was a principal, if not the primary, regulator 
of takeovers.  
III.   THE WITHERING OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION 
 The dual SEC/state court arrangement that existed at the end of the 1980s 
unexpectedly ended in the 1990s. The SEC largely abdicated its prior active 
role in takeover regulation outlined in Part II. This silence has been extended 
and significant. From 1989-2006, the SEC would only twice adopt new domes-
tic takeover rules.172 This compares to the SEC’s extensive domestic takeover-
related rulemaking during the period 1969-1989.173 Other hallmarks of SEC ac-
tivity also evaporated; no longer did the SEC seek to publicly comment on the 
takeover issues of the day or otherwise strive to set takeover policy by propos-
ing takeover legislation and rules, initiating fact-finding investigations, issuing 
concept releases, and conducting empirical and other research. In short, at the 
decade’s turn, the SEC vanished from its role as an activist takeover regulator; 
it became seemingly content to administer the current regulatory apparatus.174  
 But in fairness, the SEC’s main foray into rulemaking during this period was 
substantial. In October 1999 the SEC in the M&A Release promulgated whole-
sale revisions to the tender offer, proxy, and other merger and acquisition-
related rules.175 The M&A Release had the stated goal of raising the federal 
takeover into the modern age, and it comprehensively revised the communica-
tion requirements for acquisition transactions, attempted to put stock and cash 
tender offers on equal parity, eliminated the five business day commencement 
                                                                                                                     
 170. See generally J. Robert Brown, Jr., Regulatory Intervention in the Market for Cor-
porate Control, 23 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 3 (1989) (stating that “[w]ith no central vision of 
an appropriate regulatory scheme, [SEC takeover rules] often emerge in an effort to ame-
liorate a specific abuse or to provide shareholders with some added benefit”).  
 171. Two telling examples are, first, the SEC’s desultory contemplation of, attempts to 
promulgate, and ultimate rejection of a rule to define “tender offers” to include unconven-
tional purchases, and, second, the SEC’s shifting position, contemplated rulemaking, and 
legislative proposals concerning takeover defenses, particularly with respect to the poison 
pill. See supra Parts II.B & II.C.  
 172. These were the rules promulgated and amended in the M&A Release discussed in-
fra at notes 175-77 and accompanying text and the amendment to the all-holders/best price 
rule discussed infra at note 287. The SEC also adopted comprehensive regulation for cross-
border acquisitions. See generally Brett A. Carron & Steven M. Davidoff, Getting U.S. Se-
curity Holders to the Party: The SEC’s Cross-Border Release Five Years On, 26 U. PA. J. 
INT’L ECON. L. 455 (2005) (describing and analyzing the SEC’s cross-border rules promul-
gated in 1999). 
 173. See supra Part II. 
 174. This observation has also been made by Professor Roe in his article Delaware’s 
Competition. Roe, supra note 2, at 630.  
 175. M&A Release, supra note 51.  
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rule for tender offers, and simplified and revised acquisition disclosure re-
quirements.176 Although this regulatory action was undeniably important, it was 
designed to refine the SEC’s own existing Exchange Act disclosure rules and 
update them for the technological age.177 The action was also within SEC and 
not state domain, did not break any new ground, and did not address the signifi-
cant takeover issues of the day or update the federal takeover code to comport 
with the new playing field created by the third and fourth waves. 
 It also did not take into account the issues of the latest wave. The fifth wave 
started in the mid-1990s, and it still runs fast today. The fifth wave peaked ini-
tially in the technology bubble with over $1.7 trillion dollars in announced, do-
mestic merger activity in 2000, paused slightly in 2001-2003 with the popping 
of that bubble and the events of September 11, but continues today with $1.6 
trillion in completed domestic takeover activity in 2006.178 This wave, as with 
the third and fourth waves, engendered a transformation in deal structure and 
tactics. The majority of deals in the wave’s first part, that is, until 2001, com-
prised stock rather than cash consideration and were structured as mergers 
rather than tender offers.179 And leveraged structures using high-yield financing 
were much less frequent. However, in the second part of the fifth wave, that is, 
after 2003, leveraged structures and all cash transactions have again become 
more common due to the emergence of private equity as a dominant force in 
takeovers.180 And throughout the entire wave, negotiated transactions became 
the norm and unsolicited or hostile offers, although still occurring, were less 
common than in the previous third and fourth waves.181  
                                                                                                                     
 176. Id. at 82,578-80. 
 177. Id. at 82,579 (stating that “[w]e believe these new rules and revisions should pro-
vide participants in the securities markets sufficient flexibility to accommodate changes in 
deal structure and advances in technology that continue to occur”).  
 178.  Thomson Financial, Fourth Quarter 2006 Mergers & Acquisitions Review avail-
able at http://www.thomson.com/pdf/financial/league_table/ma/150587/4Q06_MA_ 
Global_Finl_Advisory (last visited on June 6, 2007) [hereinafter Thomson Financial].  
 179. A significant factor in the use of stock consideration during this time period was 
the inflated stock prices of corporations, particularly those in the technology sector, and 
the low relative cash-on-hand of these corporations illustrated by the all-time general low 
of dividend/price ratios. Not surprisingly, postboom there has been an observed propor-
tional increase in cash deals. It is generally believed that this is also due to a trend to-
wards more analytical and careful acquisition practices rather than other extrinsic factors 
such as the SEC’s elimination of pooling accounting. See Joseph H. Flom, Mergers and Ac-
quisitions: The Decade in Review, 54 U. MIAMI L. REV. 753, 769-70 (2000). Nonetheless, 
some have predicted that the elimination of pooling accounting has spurred the increased 
use of combination cash and stock consideration. Id. 
 180. The ability to use high-yield bonds to finance takeovers was limited to some ex-
tent in the 1980s by a 1986 Federal Reserve Board Ruling which restricted the utility of 
controlled-shell corporations. See INV. RESP. RES. CTR. STUDY, JUNK BONDS AND TENDER 
OFFER FINANCING (1986). But leveraged structures have become commonplace again in the 
prior two to three years due to the private equity boom. In 2006, private equity leveraged 
buy-outs comprised approximately twenty-six and a half percent of the domestic takeover 
market. Thomson Financial, supra note 178.  
 181. GAUGHAN, supra note 22, at 50-53. According to one study, 4% percent of transac-
tions in the 1990s were unsolicited, compared to 14.3% and 8.4% percent in the 1980s and 
1970s respectively. Gregor Andrade et al., New Evidence and Perspectives on Mergers, 15 J. 
ECON. PERSP. 103, 106 tbl.1 (2001).   
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 The issues of both the third and the fourth waves, particularly those sur-
rounding takeover defenses, going-privates, and applicable standards of review 
for takeover-related decisions, continued to percolate in the fifth one.182 But the 
fifth wave created its own unique issues. An issue at the forefront was parity be-
tween mergers and tender offers. The tendency of acquirers in the fifth wave to 
prefer mergers over tender offers was reinforced by internal biases in federal 
securities regulation, which often led acquirers to favor a merger structure. This 
is not to say that both these rules and state court regulation did not sometimes 
discriminate against mergers to the benefit of tender offers, for they did that 
too—just that the regulatory balance tilted in favor of mergers.183 Another 
emergent issue was that of lock-ups:184 the rise in negotiated transactions led to 
repeated disputes surrounding transaction defenses in the form of lock-ups and 
claims that they forced board negotiated transactions onto stockholders. Alter-
natives were foreclosed or inhibited.185 Finally, the prevalence of leveraged pri-
vate equity buy-outs and the tendency of these firms to partner with manage-
ment to opportunistically time and advantage their acquisitions has reawakened 
concerns over going-privates.  Yet the SEC slumbered on these fifth wave trou-
bles as well as the old third and fourth wave ones; the SEC either did not even 
attempt to address them or took only limited action with respect thereto through 
the M&A Release. 
 Why did this happen? The SEC never provided an explanation. However, it 
can be surmised that it was in part due to the change in Presidential administra-
tions. The first Bush Administration, unlike the Reagan one, did not express any 
particular interest in takeover regulation, and perhaps this was reflected in the 
SEC’s dormancy.186 In addition, the SEC Commissioners largely turned over at 
the time of the Bush Administration, and the new SEC Commissioners, in light 
of the issues raised by the crash of 1987, may not have been as concerned with 
takeovers as previous ones.187 This thesis finds support in the continuing inac-
tion through the Clinton and second Bush Administrations. Perhaps it was a 
                                                                                                                     
 182. See infra Part IV (discussing the Delaware court’s continuing treatment of these 
issues).  
 183. For a further discussion of tender offer biases under the federal securities law, see 
infra Part V.B.2.   
 184. A “lock-up” in the takeover context can be defined as a transaction defense 
mechanism whereby an acquiree agrees to compensate an acquirer upon the nonconsum-
mation or breach of an acquisition agreement. Marcel Kahan & Michael Klausner, Lockups 
and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1539, 1540 (1996). “Lock-ups” in-
clude break-up fees, termination fees, and stock and asset options. Id. The term also in-
cludes stockholder lock-ups—that is, agreements by stockholders to vote for or tender their 
shares in a takeover transaction.  
 185. See infra note 217 and accompanying text.  
 186. The most prominent takeover regulatory act by the Bush administration was the 
order issued to China National Aero-Technology Import and Export Corporation to divest 
its recently acquired holding in MAMCO Manufacturing, Inc. The Bush Administration is-
sued this directive under the Exon-Florio Amendments after a finding that the acquisition 
was a threat to national security. See generally Christopher R. Fenton, Note, U.S. Policy 
Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-September 11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transna-
tional Security, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 195, 209-11 (2002) (reviewing this Bush Ad-
ministration action).  
 187. See also Roe, supra note 2, at 630. 
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product of the Reagan Administration’s antiregulatory bent; the active SEC in-
volvement in takeover regulation in the fourth wave was itself directed largely 
towards curtailing state regulation.188 This Article, however, is not concerned 
with the causes of this SEC withdrawal but with its consequences.  
IV.   THE TRIUMPH OF DELAWARE OVER FEDERAL TAKEOVER 
REGULATION 
 Out of the SEC’s shadow, the Delaware courts emerged as the nation’s pri-
mary takeover regulator. Previously, as discussed above, the Delaware courts 
had a leading role—one founded on Delaware as the situs of incorporation for 
the majority of U.S. publicly traded companies. However, during the 1970s and 
1980s, other state courts had notably and influentially acted with respect to 
takeover regulation.189 This changed in the 1990s as the states largely began to 
toe the Delaware line on takeovers. Now, when other state courts acted, they 
largely followed existing takeover precedent established by the Delaware 
courts.190 And Delaware was quite energetic in drawing and redrawing this line; 
during the fifth wave, the Delaware courts have repeatedly addressed new and 
old issues in response to developments. This has propelled the authority of the 
Delaware courts to new heights. The Delaware courts’ expansionary takeover 
platform is the real takeover regulation story of the 1990s through today.  
 This is not to say that the Delaware courts have not acted during this time 
period to deregulate or loosen regulation with respect to certain aspects of take-
overs. In fact, as will be seen in this Part, much of the Delaware courts’ conduct 
was deregulatory, though the Delaware courts were careful to deregulate only in 
part, thereby maintaining a measure of oversight. Rather, the expansionary 
component referred to here is the Delaware courts’ increasingly active involve-
ment in takeover regulation. This section examines four main Delaware forays 
into takeover regulation, with a goal of contraposing the rise of the Delaware 
courts against the SEC’s disappearance and setting forth the continued progress 
of takeover regulation despite the SEC’s absence. The consequence is an in-
                                                                                                                     
 188. The SEC’s position was often at odds with other organs of the Reagan Administra-
tion, which preferred a more abstentionist path. See supra note 122. 
 189. The regulation of going-privates, for example, was addressed by courts throughout 
the country. See Greene, supra note 58, at 496-506.  
 190. See, e.g., Guhan Subramanian, The Drivers of Market Efficiency in Revlon Trans-
actions, 28 J. CORP. L. 691, 704 (2003) (stating that “most states outside Delaware follow 
Revlon [but] California, Indiana, Pennsylvania, New Jersey, North Carolina, Ohio, and 
Virginia have explicitly rejected Revlon through a combination of statutory law and case 
law”). The state legislatures were similarly docile. Some, notably Pennsylvania and Michi-
gan, occasionally attempted to legislatively—and some would argue egregiously—influence 
the outcome of takeovers of particular significance to their state. See Kathryn Tully, Penn-
sylvania Bails Out Sovereign Bancorp: US State’s Decision to Pass a Law Protecting a 
Bank from Shareholder Activists Is Seen as a Setback for Investors, EUROMONEY, Mar. 1,  
2006, at 43 (reporting on a Pennsylvania law passed in 2006 and an amendment to a 
Michigan statute in 2003, both enacted to influence the outcome of a takeover involving a 
domestic corporation). But the state legislatures were more often content to tweak existing 
law, occasionally gathering enough energy to go a bit further and adopt new takeover stat-
utes.  
240  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:211 
 
creasing disconnect between federal takeover regulation and the takeover con-
duct it today purports to regulate.  
A.   Takeover Standards 
 The Delaware courts in the fifth wave continued to address the appropriate 
standard governing an acquiree board’s takeover decision. The Delaware Su-
preme Court had first addressed this issue in 1985 in Revlon.191 The Revlon 
court held that, upon a board decision to effect a change of control or breakup 
of the corporation, a board’s fiduciary duties require it to obtain the highest 
price reasonably available for the corporation’s stockholders.192 Revlon was de-
cided when the SEC was making a full-court press to regulate takeover defenses 
and could also be spun as an attempt to stave off SEC action.193 The SEC disap-
pearance released this pressure valve, and it did not take long for the Delaware 
Supreme Court to act.  
 In the 1990 case of Paramount Communications v. Time Inc.194 and the 1994 
case of Paramount Communications v. QVC Network Inc.195 the Delaware Su-
preme Court further defined the contours of and limited its previous holding in 
Revlon. The Delaware Supreme Court opinions in Time and QVC significantly 
weakened the Revlon decision by restricting Revlon’s application to a corpora-
tion’s breakup or change of control.196 Accordingly, in a post-Time/QVC world, 
except in a change of control context, antitakeover and transaction defenses do 
not implicate Revlon and are not subject to strict scrutiny.197 These decisions 
also eliminated stock-for-stock acquisition transactions from review under Rev-
lon’s higher standard.198 In such transactions, both acquirer and acquiree stock-
holders share ownership of the merged entities and therefore control is almost 
always indeterminate. Revlon duties are accordingly inapplicable and the trans-
action subject to intermediate review under Unocal199 except in atypical circum-
stances.200 This exclusion heavily influenced the structure of fifth wave transac-
tions and spurred the widespread use of stock consideration; participants could 
now characterize their stock-for-stock transactions as “mergers of equals” and 
avoid application of Revlon.201 More importantly, though, this pair of cases es-
                                                                                                                     
 191. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). 
 192. Id. at 182. 
 193. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 194. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1990). 
 195. 637 A.2d 34 (Del. 1994). 
 196. See id. at 47; Time, 571 A.2d 1140. 
 197. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, Nightmare on Main Street: The Paramount Pic-
ture Horror Show©, 16 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 15 (1991) (reviewing the interplay of Time and 
Revlon and arguing that “[t]he Delaware Supreme Court . . . narrowly constru[ed] Revlon’s 
scope”). 
 198. See, e.g., In re Santa Fe Pac. Corp. S’holder Litig., 669 A.2d 59, 70-71 (Del. 1995) 
(holding that Revlon duties do not apply where 67% of the corporation is acquired for stock 
and the remainder for cash). 
 199. The scope of intermediate review under Unocal is discussed infra at Part IV.B. 
 200. See, e.g., Arnold v. Soc’y for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d 1270, 1289-90 (Del. 1994) 
(holding Revlon duties inapplicable to a stock-for-stock transaction).   
 201. See generally James A. Fanto, Braking the Merger Momentum: Reforming Corpo-
rate Law Governing Mega-Mergers, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 249, 304-10 (2001) (surveying appli-
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tablished the Delaware courts’ willingness to relax takeover standards in light 
of the SEC’s dormancy and, despite the deregulatory nature of its acts, the 
Delaware courts’ primacy as the arbiter of the takeover decision.202  
B.   Takeover Defenses 
 The Delaware courts in the fifth wave also continued their active regulation 
of takeover defenses. Not surprisingly, given the SEC inattention, this regula-
tion tended towards the permissive side while simultaneously preserving an 
oversight role for the Delaware courts. The first steps had been taken previously 
in the fourth wave in Unocal, which held that a Delaware court should review a 
board’s defensive actions under an intermediate standard to ascertain whether 
they were “reasonable in relation to the threat posed.”203 Unocal, like Revlon, 
could also be painted as a crafted response to the SEC’s protakeover stance: the 
Delaware court’s decision to regulate (and limit) takeover defenses an olive 
branch to account for the Unocal court’s refusal, against SEC wishes, to 
find the exclusionary self-tender being considered therein as dispropor-
tional.204 It is therefore again not unexpected that, in the SEC’s absence, the 
Delaware courts would act to limit the Unocal holding and expand a target 
board’s defensive arsenal.  
 The Delaware Supreme Court first struck in the Time decision. The court not 
only restricted Revlon’s scope but also interpreted Unocal’s proportionality 
standard of review broadly by effectively upholding the “just-say-no” defense 
as a reasonable takeover response under Unocal.205 The SEC’s fears in the 
fourth wave had now come to pass. Through use of the poison pill a target 
board could now, unless replaced, forestall a takeover by simply refusing to 
countenance an offer.206  
 Then, in 1995 the Delaware Supreme Court further relaxed Unocal’s stric-
tures on takeover defenses in Unitrin, Inc. v. American General Corp.207 Unitrin 
                                                                                                                     
cable regulatory standards for agreed stock-for-stock mergers); John C. Coffee, Jr., Under 
the “Merger of Equals” Doctrine, Can a Target Board Always Favor a Friendly Suitor When 
a Second Bidder Makes a Higher, Unsolicited Offer?, NAT’L L.J., Mar. 30, 1998, at B5 (ob-
serving that target boards can avoid application of Revlon scrutiny by structuring ac-
quisition transactions so that they appear to be “a merger of equals” rather than an 
acquisition). 
 202. See Jeffrey N. Gordon, Corporations, Markets, and Courts, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 
1931 (1991) (arguing that management and public opposition to takeovers influenced the 
Delaware court decision to relax the Revlon standard in Time). 
 203. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (1985).  
 204. See id. at 956-57. It didn’t work. The SEC quickly acted to reverse this holding 
through adoption of the all-holders rule. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. 
 205. See Paramount Commc’ns v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1990).  
 206. As Professor Ronald Gilson has observed, this has created a presumptive bias for 
unsolicited offers to be resolved through proxy contests rather than via tender offers and 
market purchases. See Ronald J. Gilson, Unocal Fifteen Years Later (and What We Can Do 
About It), 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 491, 503-07 (2001). See also Joseph A. Grundfest, Just Vote 
No: A Minimalist Strategy for Dealing with Barbarians Inside the Gates, 45 STAN. L. REV. 
857, 858 (1993) (observing that unsolicited bidders attempting to take over targets who 
have adopted a poison pill will “have to couple proxy contests with tender offers”).  
 207. 651 A.2d 1361 (1995).  
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even further broadened the concept of proportionality under Unocal to provide 
target boards wide latitude in their ability to adopt strong, potentially preclusive 
takeover defenses.208 Thereafter, many an academic asserted that Unocal was 
dead—a strictly procedural formality.209 This was hyperbolic. The Delaware 
courts did continue to pay Unocal sacrificial heed on at least some level, em-
ploying it as a backstop to ensure continued Delaware supervision of takeovers. 
Accordingly, on the edges of Unocal, the Delaware courts, acting in their take-
over supervisory role, repeatedly punished target boards who completely shut 
off a bid’s potential for success, however remote, or who otherwise unfairly 
acted mid-contest to alter the rules of the game to the same effect.210 But these 
decisions were islands in a sea of permissiveness. The Delaware courts in the 
fifth wave largely upheld the vast majority of takeover defensive action while 
still maintaining enough discretion and the threat of action to preserve their 
oversight role.211 
                                                                                                                     
 208. See id. at 1387-90. See also Moore Corp. v. Wallace Computer Servs., 907 F. Supp. 
1545, 1563 (D. Del. 1995) (holding board refusal to redeem a poison pill was “within a 
‘range of reasonableness’ ” under Unocal).   
 209. See, e.g., Robert B. Thompson & D. Gordon Smith, Towards a New Theory of the 
Shareholder Role: “Sacred Space” in Corporate Takeovers, 80 TEX. L. REV. 261, 284-86 
(2001) (asserting that Unocal is “dea[d]”). 
 210. Thus, in Mentor Graphics Corp. v. Quickturn Design Systems, 728 A.2d 25 (Del. 
Ch. 1998), aff’d sub nom., Quickturn Design Sys., Inc. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 1281 (Del. 
1998), the Delaware Court of Chancery struck down a poison pill as disproportionate under 
Unocal. Id. at 44-52. See generally Peter V. Letsou, Are Dead Hand (and No Hand) Poison 
Pills Really Dead?, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101 (2000). Then, in Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 
A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000), the Court of Chancery held that a bylaw provision adopted mid-
takeover battle, which effectively frustrated an unsolicited bidder after its successful proxy 
battle, was not sustainable under Unocal. See id. at 342-44. 
 211. Since Unitrin, the Delaware courts have held four takeover defense responses to 
be disproportional under the Unocal standard. All except Omnicare were decided in the 
Court of Chancery. See Omnicare Inc. v. NCS Healthcare, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Chesa-
peake Corp., 771 A.2d at 293; Mentor Graphics, 728 A.2d at 25; Carmody v. Toll Bros., 723 
A.2d 1180 (Del. Ch. 1998). Unitrin itself overturned a finding by the Court of Chancery 
that the takeover defenses adopted therein were invalid under Unocal. See In re Unitrin, 
Inc. S’holders Litig., Civ. A Nos. 13656 & 13699, 1994 WL 698483 (Del. Ch. Oct. 13, 1994). 
The Delaware courts also initiated periodic review of transactions under the holding of 
Blasius Industries v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651, 659-61 (Del. Ch. 1988). The standard in 
Blasius is applied when “the primary purpose of the board’s action is to interfere with or 
impede exercise of the shareholder franchise and the stockholders are not given a full and 
fair opportunity to vote.” Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368, 1376 (Del. 1996) (quoting 
Stroud v. Grace, 606 A.2d 75, 92 (Del. 1992)) (internal quotations omitted). There had been 
some debate in the 1990s concerning the continued existence of this standard and its fit 
with the Unocal standard. But the Delaware Supreme Court reaffirmed its validity in MM 
Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003), when the court applied a Blasius 
analysis within an application of the Unocal standard to overturn the Liquid Audio board’s 
expansion of itself from five to seven members, an action which effectively defeated a hos-
tile proxy contest. MM Cos., 813 A.2d at 1132. The interplay of Unocal and Blasius is dis-
cussed extensively in Harry G. Hutchison, Director Primacy and Corporate Governance: 
Shareholder Voting Rights Captured by the Accountability/Authority Paradigm, 36 LOY. U. 
CHI. L.J. 1111, 1172-85 (2005). 
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C.   Transaction Defenses 
 The widespread use of the stock-for-stock merger structure in the fifth wave 
also heralded the increased use of the lock-up transaction defense.212 This trend 
was buoyed by the Delaware courts in 1997 in Brazen v. Bell Atlantic Corp.213 
In Brazen, the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of a $550 million 
termination fee agreed in the negotiated stock-for-stock merger-of-equals trans-
action between Bell Atlantic and NYNEX.214 The court refused to scrutinize 
under fiduciary duty principles the board decision to agree to the fee, instead 
applying a liquidated damages contractual analysis to uphold the fee under rea-
sonableness grounds.215 Henceforth, acquirers agreeing to transactions without 
the specter of another bid would have wide latitude to agree to potentially pre-
clusive lock-ups.216 The effect was to make intervening bids more difficult and 
costly. This also gave a substantial, potentially preclusive, head start to an ac-
quiree board’s choice of acquirer.217 
 Then, in Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Healthcare,218 the Delaware courts limited 
the ability of a majority stockholder to agree to a stock lock-up when the ac-
quiree had agreed to a “force-the-vote” provision.219 The court held that, under 
                                                                                                                     
 212. In their study of lock-ups, Professors John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian 
found that “[i]n friendly U.S. mergers greater than $50 million in value, lockups appeared 
in 80% of deals in 1998, compared to 40% of deals a decade ago.” See John C. Coates IV & 
Guhan Subramanian, A Buy-Side Model of M&A Lockups: Theory and Evidence, 53 STAN. 
L. REV. 307, 310 (2000).  They also found that “all-stock deals are much more likely to have 
stock lockups than cash deals (39% vs. 12%) or deals involving mixed consideration (18%), 
but are not more likely to have breakup fees than cash deals (46% vs. 47%) or mixed deals 
(55%).” Id. at 391-92.  
 213. 695 A.2d 43 (Del. 1997). 
 214. Id. at 45. However, the supreme court’s holding was arguably at odds with its de-
cision in Time which held that “structural safety devices” in non-Revlon transactions were 
to be reviewed under Unocal’s proportional standard. See Paramount Commc’ns v. Time 
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1151 (Del. 1990). 
 215. See Brazen, 695 A.2d at 45.  
 216. See, e.g., In re IXC Commc’ns Inc. S’holders Litig., Nos. C.A. 17324  & C.A. 17334, 
1999 WL 1009174, at *10 (Del. Ch. Oct. 27, 1999) (“[E]nhanced judicial scrutiny does not 
apply . . . [as] [n]either the termination fee, the stock option agreements nor the no-
solicitation provisions are defensive mechanisms instituted to respond to a perceived 
threat to a potential acquirer.”). The Delaware courts were equally sanguine about trans-
actions on the other end of the playing field, those in Revlon-land. In two decisions ren-
dered in 2001 and 2004, respectively, In re Pennaco Energy, Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 
787 A.2d 691, 705-06 (Del. Ch. 2001), and In re MONY Group Shareholder Litigation, 852 
A.2d 9, 18-24 (Del. Ch. 2004), the Delaware courts gave broad discretion to an acquiree’s 
ability to agree to lock-ups in a change of control context.   
 217. Professors Coates’ and Subramanian’s empirical research has led them to con-
clude that “when another bidder is present, a lockup more than doubles the likelihood of 
completion for the first bidder.” Coates & Subramanian, supra note 212, at 348. On this 
basis, they argue that “foreclosing lockups do exist, and, more generally, that lockups do 
influence bid outcomes.” Id. at 389.  
 218. 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003).  
 219. This provision, if agreed to by the acquiree, requires the target to hold a vote on 
the acquisition transaction even if the acquiree board of directors decides to withdraw its 
recommendation for the transaction. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2006). Meanwhile, the 
stockholder lock-up itself typically obligates the stockholder parties to irrevocably vote in 
favor of the acquisition. These two provisions interact to effectively sew up the acquisition 
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Unocal, this certainty was deficient; a contractually foreclosing lock-up was 
henceforth required to be subject to a “fiduciary-out” clause whereby the ac-
quiree board could terminate the transaction and the lock-up if, in light of sub-
sequent developments, including a competing offer, the board’s fiduciary duties 
required it to.220 Omnicare was yet another incursion; it now put another cate-
gory of takeover-related conduct—stockholder lock-ups—under supervision of 
the Delaware courts.221  
 Omnicare was also the most significant and controversial Delaware court 
decision in favor of stockholder choice since the Revlon decision itself.222 In the 
end, though, the Delaware courts never addressed the fundamental question of 
stockholder lock-ups per se, and their use post-Omnicare remains widespread, 
albeit subject to the restrictions set forth in Omnicare and the oversight of the 
Delaware courts. Thus, the significance of Omnicare for this Article is another 
instance of the Delaware courts seizing the takeover regulator mantle. Their 
willingness to confront, regulate, and address the takeover issues of the day 
thereby redefined material elements of takeover law and influence takeover tac-
tics and strategy.  
D.   Going-Privates 
 Going-private transactions also continued to prominently figure in the juris-
prudence of the Delaware courts. The Delaware Supreme Court had previously, 
in the fourth wave, refined its holding in Singer to discard the “business pur-
pose” test. The court held that going-private transactions should be reviewed 
solely under Singer’s “entire fairness” prong. 223 This changed in the new mil-
lennium. In In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation,224 the Court of 
Chancery, per Vice Chancellor Strine, held that the “entire fairness” standard 
was applicable only to merger transactions, not tender offers.225 Pure Resources 
                                                                                                                     
for an acquirer no matter the will of the other stockholders; there is no ability to escape. If 
the lock-up does not extend to a dispositive number of shares, it still tips the scales in favor 
of the acquiree transaction. 
 220. Omnicare, 818 A.2d at 934-36. 
 221. The Court of Chancery strictly construed the scope of Omnicare in Orman v. 
Cullman, No. Civ.A. 18039, 2004 WL 2348395 (Del. Ch. Oct. 20, 2004). Orman relied heav-
ily on Brazen to hold that a stockholder lock-up can be used to reduce the stockholder 
choice to a binary one: either the transaction at hand or no transaction—even in light of 
Omnicare, a stockholder lock-up can still under Delaware law forestall other alternatives. 
Id. at *5.  
 222. See Tamara Loomis, Beware Delaware: The State’s Recent Supreme Court Deci-
sions Make Waves, N.Y. L.J., May 15, 2003, at 5 (reporting prostockholder nature of the 
decision has “sent shock waves through the corporate legal community”). 
 223. See Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). The abandonment of 
the business purpose test could also be viewed as a response to the implementation by the 
SEC of its own going-private rules; Delaware was now at liberty to relax its own standard. 
In Kahn v. Lynch Communication Systems, 638 A.2d 1110 (Del. 1994), the Delaware Su-
preme Court further refined the Weinberger holding. It held that approval by an acquiree 
special committee did not obviate the Delaware court’s required entire fairness review but 
merely shifted the burden of proof from the acquirer to the challenging stockholders. Id. at 
1117.  
 224. 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002).  
 225. Id. at 444. 
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held that, provided certain procedures were followed, going-private transactions 
effected via tender offer would be reviewed by the Delaware courts under the 
business judgment rule and not a higher standard.226 Moreover, approval by a 
special committee or entire board of the acquiree was not a requirement for this 
relaxed review.227 This was a significant side-step for the Delaware courts be-
cause it not only offered a path to deregulate going-private tender offer transac-
tions but effectively removed the Delaware courts from supervision of such trans-
actions.228 Going forward and until a Delaware Supreme Court decision to the 
contrary, rational acquirers in going-privates will preferentially escape Delaware 
court review of their transactions by employing a tender offer structure.229 
E.   Federal Takeover Regulation Circa 2007 
 We continue to ride the fifth wave of takeover activity. During this time, the 
Delaware courts have emerged as the nation’s primary takeover regulator: ac-
tively involved, regulating almost every aspect of the takeover. Furthermore, 
while the Delaware courts sometimes acted to deregulate, they maintained their 
supervision of takeovers by resorting to another of the various skeins of height-
                                                                                                                     
 226. Id. at 446.  
 227. Id. at 446-47. See also In re Siliconix Inc. S’holders Litig., No. Civ. A. 18700, 2001 
WL 716787, at *6 (Del. Ch. June 19, 2001) (stating that “unless coercion or disclosure vio-
lations can be shown, no defendant has the duty to demonstrate the entire fairness of this 
proposed tender transaction”). See generally Jason M. Quintana, Going Private Transac-
tions: Delaware’s Race to the Bottom?, 2004 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 547 (analyzing recent devel-
opments in Delaware going-private jurisprudence through a state charter competition lens).  
 228. The path was hewn in Glassman v. Unocal Exploration Corp., 777 A.2d 242, 243 
(Del. 2001). In Glassman, the Delaware Supreme Court held that “absent fraud or illegal-
ity,” a short-form merger was subject to review under the business judgment rule, rather 
than an entire fairness standard, and specifically, the court held that “appraisal is the ex-
clusive remedy available to a minority stockholder who objects to a short-form merger.” Id. 
at 248. See also In re Unocal Exploration Corp. S’holders Litig., 793 A.2d 329 (Del Ch. 
2000) (holding entire-fairness review is not implicated in short-form mergers). In Dela-
ware, once a stockholder acquires ninety percent or more of a corporation’s stock, it can 
cash out the remaining minority without a stockholder vote. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §253 
(2006). Accordingly, Glassman and Pure Resources provide a clear way for a controlling 
stockholder to initiate a tender offer in a going-private, obtain ninety percent of a corpora-
tion’s stock, and then cash out the minority without a stockholder vote and having to un-
dergo substantive review for entire fairness.   
 229. See Christopher A. Iacono, Comment, Tender Offers and Short-Form Mergers by 
Controlling Shareholders Under Delaware Law: The “800-Pound Gorilla” Continues Unim-
peded—In re Pure Resources, Inc., Shareholders Litigation, 28 DEL. J. CORP. L. 645, 671 
(2003) (“Because of the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in Pure Resources, the posi-
tion of the tender offer followed by a short-form merger has been secured as the most fa-
vorable transaction for controlling shareholders.”). In In re Cox Communications, Inc., 
Shareholders Litigation, 879 A.2d 604 (Del. Ch. 2005), Vice Chancellor Strine suggested “a 
relatively modest alteration of Lynch” in which “if a controller proposed a merger, subject 
from inception to negotiation and approval of the merger by an independent special com-
mittee and a Minority Approval Condition, the business judgment rule should presump-
tively apply.” Id. at 643-44 (footnote omitted). The only modesty here is Vice Chancellor 
Strine’s understatement; his dictum calls into question the status of Lynch and even 
Weinberger. 
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ened review previously established.230 And, if the mainstay takeover standards 
did not suit, the Delaware courts were not shy about conjuring up other judicial 
standards and statutes to scrutinize these transactions.231 Additionally, only 
once did the Delaware courts act to fully deregulate—the Court of Chan-
cery’s decision in Pure Resources, and its holding is still subject to consid-
eration by the Delaware Supreme Court.232 The result was a spaghetti of 
holdings and standards in which scholars struggled to find doctrinal coherence 
and order.233 However, one explanation for this disarray is to view these deci-
sions through this Article’s prism: the Delaware’s courts’ labors to maintain a 
firm regulatory and supervisory grip even when ostensibly acting in a deregula-
tory fashion.234 These fifth wave decisions generally preserved and extended 
the ability of target officers, directors, and controlling stockholders to d 
                                                                                                                     
 230. Thus, in Chesapeake Corp. and Mentor Graphics, Revlon duties were not impli-
cated since Time and QVC had restricted their applicability, yet the courts still could in-
voke the Unocal standard to sustain their holdings. Similarly, despite the confines Brazen 
previously placed on court review of lock-ups, the Delaware courts could still apply Unocal 
to decide Omnicare.   
 231. See, e.g., ACE Ltd. v. Capital Re Corp., 747 A.2d 95, 108-09 (Del. Ch. 1999) (hold-
ing that a board’s fiduciary duties of care and loyalty require the court to enjoin enforce-
ment of a contractual no-talk provision); Phelps Dodge Corp. v. Cyprus Amax Minerals Co., 
Nos. Civ. A. 17398, Civ. A. 17383, Civ. A. 17427, 1999 WL 1054255, at *1 (Del. Ch. Sept. 
27, 1999) (holding that it may constitute a breach of the board’s duty of care to agree to a 
no-talk provision in a merger agreement); Quickturn Design Sys. v. Shapiro, 721 A.2d 
1281, 1292 (Del. 1998) (holding adoption of dead-hand poison pill violative of 8 Del. C. 
§ 141(a) (1998)). See also supra note 211 (discussing application of Blasius standard in 
Liquid Audio).  
 232. See supra notes 224-29 and accompanying text. Some predict that, if it considers 
the matter, the Delaware Supreme Court would overrule Pure Resources and maintain its 
previous consistent bias towards court supervision of going-private transactions and gen-
eral refusal to wholly deregulate takeover decisions. See Lawrence Lederman & Faith 
Stevelman Kahn, Conflict Irresolution, DAILY DEAL, Sept. 19, 2005, available at 2005 
WLNR 14646788 (“In a fresh look [at going-private transactions], we can expect the [Dela-
ware] Supreme Court to retain entire fairness review, regardless of the form of the trans-
action, and make the tender offer format conform to mergers rather than the other way 
around.”). Others, perhaps more cynical, dispute this prognostication. See Iacono, supra 
note 229, at 670 (stating that the Delaware Supreme Court “would most likely affirm that the 
entire fairness standard is inapplicable to tender offers made by controlling shareholders”). 
 233. See, e.g., Marcel Kahan, Paramount or Paradox: The Delaware Supreme Court’s 
Takeover Jurisprudence, 19 J. CORP. L. 583, 584 (1994) (stating that commentators “have 
referred to the [Delaware] [S]upreme [C]ourt’s takeover jurisprudence as mush and mud; 
disparaged the court for waffling and wavering; criticized its opinions for drawing distinc-
tions ‘without foundation,’ being ‘equivocal,’ and lacking clarity”); Skeel, supra note 165, at 
166 (“From a doctrinal perspective, Time[] and QVC are extremely difficult to reconcile.”). 
See generally William T. Allen et al., Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of 
Review in Delaware Corporation Law, 26 DEL. J. CORP. L. 859, 864 (2001) (reviewing the 
standards of review and conduct promulgated by the Delaware courts and observing that 
“new standards of review [have] proliferated”). 
 234. There is a subtle interplay here between the Delaware courts’ shifting standards 
and regulation and the maintenance of such standards and regulations. Specifically, 
swings in these standards and regulation themselves can be viewed as a function of the 
Delaware courts as a regulating entity. See Griffith & Steele, supra note 11, at 2 (noting 
“the ability of state corporate law, especially in Delaware, to alternate between lax and 
stringent regulation, shifting between hard-edged rules and fuzzy standards” in response 
to crises and other public developments). 
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irect  the takeover decision.235 This relaxation in standards can also be character-
ized as furthering promanagement ends, including the ability of management to 
entrench itself, to the detriment of stockholder choice.236 All of this conduct was 
consequential, but particularly so since in the fifth wave the Delaware courts 
became the sole regulator of takeovers. Thus, it no longer mattered that the 
1980s SEC would most likely have vigorously opposed these Delaware court 
holdings or that the Delaware courts would therefore likely have not treaded so 
far in favoring corporate management interests in light of such opposition. The 
SEC was nowhere in sight—a state that still exists today.  
V.   THE FAILURE OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION 
 The SEC abstention not only permitted a new, Delaware-driven takeover 
code to emerge, it also engendered an increasing mismatch between the federal 
takeover code and the takeovers that it was created to govern. The federal take-
over code had largely been established in the 1960s through the Williams Act 
and built upon by the SEC through the 1980s. This model had been constructed 
for a time when acquisitions were perpetuated in another manner, takeover tac-
tics and strategies different, takeover and transaction defenses virtually non-
existent, capital markets less well-developed, and research on the validity and 
utility of various takeover substantive, procedural, and disclosure requirements 
unavailable or preliminary. Yet the federal takeover rules have remained static 
in the face of these developments as the SEC failed to adapt them to changed 
circumstance. The result is an outdated federal takeover code. Moreover, the 
takeover laws promulgated by the Delaware courts have arguably exacerbated 
these federal failings and altered the requirements for future, necessary federal 
action. This Part traces these shortfalls by illuminating some of the more 
trenchant examples.  
A.   The Failure of the Williams Act 
 The following three examples illustrate Williams Act’s outdatedness due to 
the substantially changed takeover environment existent today.  
                                                                                                                     
 235. See generally Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Compe-
tition for Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1067 (2000) (“[E]vidence suggests 
that, although Delaware is successful in attracting charters, its law is not optimal. . . . 
Delaware law appears to favor management interests at the expense of shareholder inter-
ests.”). Unfortunately, not all of Delaware’s conduct fits neatly into this box. Certainly, 
Kahn and Omnicare are outliers. But they can still be shoehorned into this Article’s thesis 
if explained as an assertion of regulatory authority by the Delaware courts.  
 236. Thus, Time and QVC cut back the compass of Revlon duties, thereby increasing 
the power of target directors to reject, in the stead of stockholders, a takeover; Unitrin 
enlarged the play-book of board permitted takeover defensive conduct under Unocal; Bra-
zen expanded a board’s capacity to contractually grant lock-ups inhibitory and possibly 
preclusive of other alternative, stockholder preferred transactions; and Pure Resources en-
hanced controlling stockholders’ and management’s ability to take a corporation private 
and freeze out minority stockholders. See supra Parts IV.A-IV.D. 
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1.   Offer Period 
 In 1979, the SEC set the minimum offer period for a full tender offer at 
twenty business days.237 The purpose was to finish off the “Saturday Night Spe-
cial” and slow unsolicited, coercive offers which forced overly hasty stock-
holder decisions to tender.238 Today, short-period offers of this nature are pre-
cluded by the poison pill, which effectively necessitates a concomitant and 
time-consuming proxy contest if the target board does not consent to the pro-
posed transaction.239 This has rendered the federal minimum offer period redun-
dant and unnecessary to the extent it purports to protect stockholders from the 
coercive aspects of short-period tender offers. Thus, the original rationale un-
derpinning this rule no longer exists.  
 In this absence, there are arguments that this period is too short, too long, or 
even unnecessary. First, the allotted period is arguably insufficient to permit 
stockholder consideration of the transaction and for alternatives to emerge. The 
period should rather be that of two to three months in a merger transaction or 
even longer.240 This is an argument that has been put forth for decades.241 But it 
has stronger purchase in today’s takeover environment since an acquiree can 
now agree to a tender offer structure with a preselected acquirer which includes 
potentially preclusive lock-up provisions that favor and advantage this ac-
quirer.242 Accordingly, an acquiree’s ability to select a shorter tender offer over 
a merger period in the presence of lock-ups is yet another arguably unneeded 
way for an acquiree to incrementally favor a chosen acquirer.243  
 Alternatively, reasons militate towards either a shorter mandatory period or 
none at all. In the advent of the poison pill, truly hostile takeovers are no longer 
possible,244 and it could be argued that the period for an any-and-all tender offer 
is one that should or could be negotiated and set between the acquiree and the 
acquirer as a bargain between two commercially sophisticated, equally footed 
parties. Furthermore, application of mainstay fiduciary duty principles could 
                                                                                                                     
 237. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1(a) (1980).  
 238. See Prentice & Langmore, supra note 125, at 435 n.291. 
 239. See supra note 206.  
 240. This could mitigate the potentially coercive nature of tender offers. See generally 
Lucian Arye Bebchuk, The Pressure to Tender: An Analysis and a Proposed Remedy, 12 
DEL. J. CORP. L. 911 (1987); Louis Lowenstein, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A 
Proposal for Legislation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 307-09 (1983). 
 241. See e.g., Arthur J. Goldberg, Regulation of Hostile Tender Offers: A Dissenting 
View and Recommended Reforms, 43 MD. L. REV. 225, 232-33 (1984) (arguing for a manda-
tory freeze-period of 120 days for tender offers to permit competing offers to emerge and 
adequate antitrust review); Lowenstein, supra note 240, at 317 (proposing a six-month of-
fer period for unsolicited tender offers which are not accepted by a target board). This ar-
gument is supported by the common practice in tender offers for stockholders, particularly 
stockholders who are arbitrageurs and represent a significant if not majority of tendering 
shares, to wait until the last day to tender despite the existence of withdrawal rights. 
James R. Pagano, Note, The Constitutionality of Second Generation Takeover Statutes, 73 
VA. L. REV. 203, 228 n.146 (1987). 
 242. See supra Part IV.C.  
 243. This is evidenced by the rarity of acquirers and acquirees contractually agreeing 
to a tender offer period that is longer than the statutory minimum.  
 244. See supra note 206 and accompanying text. 
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function to protect stockholders from a board’s attempt to coerce its own stock-
holders through a curtailed offer period.245 Regulation is therefore unneces-
sary, and its removal or curtailment possibly a boon to takeover activity by 
speeding up these acquisitions to a measured degree and inducing an in-
creased rate of bidding.246  
2.   Outside Purchases 
 Former Rule 10b-13 (now redesignated Rule 14e-5) prohibits bidder pur-
chases outside of a tender offer from the time of announcement until comple-
tion.247 The primary reason put forth by the SEC for barring these purchases in 
1969 was that they “operate[] to the disadvantage of the security holders who 
have already deposited their securities and who are unable to withdraw them in 
order to obtain the advantage of possible resulting higher market prices.”248 This 
is no longer correct; bidders are now obligated to offer unlimited withdrawal 
rights throughout the offer period.249 Moreover, Rule 10b-13 was issued at a 
time when targets had no ability to defend against these bidder purchases. They 
were yet another coercive and abusive tactic whereby the bidder could obtain 
control through purchases without the tender offer, thereby exerting pressure on 
stockholders to tender before the bidder terminated or completed its offer on the 
basis of these purchases.250 This is not feasible today. Poison pills and second 
and later generation state takeover statutes act to restrict these purchases to 
                                                                                                                     
 245. The fifteen-day waiting period for cash tender offers under the HSR Act would 
still typically apply to impose a de facto minimum waiting period. See 16 C.F.R. § 803.10 
(2006).  
 246. Professors Jarrell & Bradley have also argued that an extended period is detri-
mental to bidder incentives to bid because it permits other prospective bidders to free-ride 
on the initial bidder’s knowledge and reputational investment. See generally Gregg A. 
Jarrell & Michael Bradley, The Economic Effects of Federal and State Regulations of Cash 
Tender Offers, 23 J.L. & ECON. 371 (1980). This and other arguments for shortening or 
eliminating the period are in line with studies finding that takeover premiums and the 
number of bids actually declined following the adoption of the Williams Act. See Kevin S. 
Nathan & Terrence B. O’Keefe, The Rise in Takeover Premiums: An Exploratory Study, 23 
J. FIN. ECON. 101, 115-18 (1989) (finding that mean takeover premiums declined in the six 
years immediately following the Williams Act and then increased in 1974). For general 
criticism of the Williams Act on economic efficiency grounds, see Daniel R. Fischel, Effi-
cient Capital Market Theory, the Market for Corporate Control, and the Regulation of Cash 
Tender Offers, 57 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1978). 
 247. 17 C.F.R. § 230.14e-5 (2006). See generally M&A Release, supra note 51, at 
82,608-12. 
 248. Rule 10b-13 Release, supra note 51, at 83,708. 
 249. 17 C.F.R. § 230.14d-7. 
 250. The SEC stated in the 10b-13 Release that such purchases could 
defeat the tender offer, either by driving the market price above the offer price 
or by otherwise reducing the number of shares tendered below the stated 
minimum. Alternatively, they could further the tender offer by raising the 
market price to the point where ordinary investors sell in the market to arbi-
trageurs, who in turn tender. 
Rule 10b-13 Release, supra note 51, at 83,708. The SEC here appeared to misapprehend 
the relationship of arbitrageurs and stockholders in takeovers. Even in the 1960s, many 
stockholders sold in the market immediately upon transaction announcement. See gener-
ally Frederick B. Henry, Activities of Arbitrageurs in Tender Offers, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 466 
(1971). 
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threshold noncontrolling levels without target approval.251 In the wake of these 
developments, the original reasons underlying the promulgation of Rule 10b-13 
no longer exist.  
 Moreover, Rule 14e-5, by its terms, acts to confine bidder purchases to peri-
ods prior to offer announcement.252 However, a bidder’s capacity to make pre-
announcement acquisitions has been adversely effected by a number of subse-
quent changes in the takeover code, such as the Hart-Scott-Rodino waiting and 
review period requirements.253 These have combined to chill a bidder’s ability 
to make preannouncement acquisitions or forthrightly precluded such pur-
chases. Consequently, one study has recently reported that at least forty-seven 
percent of initial bidders have a zero equity position upon entrance into a con-
test for corporate control.254  
 A bidder’s preannouncement purchase of a stake in the target, known as a 
toehold, can be beneficial. The toehold purchase defrays bidder costs, incentiv-
izes the bidder to complete the takeover, and reduces free-rider and information 
asymmetry problems.255 This can lead to higher and more frequent bids. 
Meanwhile, market purchases amidst a tender offer can provide similar 
benefits while providing market liquidity and confidence for arbitrageurs to 
fully act in the market.256   
 Since the initial premise for this rule is no longer valid and recent research 
supports encouragement of these purchases, the SEC should accordingly con-
sider loosening restrictions on bidder toeholds and postannouncement pur-
chases. This deregulation may be particularly appropriate in order to defray 
bidder sunk costs if a regime for corporate control transactions which prohibits 
or limits lock-ups is ever adopted.257  
                                                                                                                     
 251. For a discussion of the limitations on acquisitions placed by state takeover stat-
utes, see Pinto, supra note 156, at 713-16.  
 252. 17 C.F.R. § 230.14e-5. 
 253. See generally George Cummings, Jr. et al., HSR Compliance Guidelines, in 
VENTURE CAPITAL: GETTING FINANCING IN A CHANGING ENVIRONMENT  (PLI Corp. Law and 
Practice, Course Handbook Series No. B0-017M, Sept. 2001). 
 254. Sandra Betton & B. Espen Eckbo, Toeholds, Bid Jumps, and Expected Payoffs in 
Takeovers, 13 REV. FIN. ST. 841 (2000).  
 255. See Jeremy Bulow et al., Toeholds and Takeovers, 107 J. POL. ECONOMY 427 
(1999) (arguing that toeholds mitigate the problem of asymmetric information); Sanford J. 
Grossman & Oliver D. Hart, Takeover Bids, the Free-Rider Problem and the Theory of the 
Corporation, 11 BELL J. ECON. 42-64 (1980).  See also Jun Qian, Toehold Acquisitions, 
Market Reaction, and Corporate Control (Apr. 2001), http://ssrn.com/abstract=270098 (survey-
ing the literature and arguing that a toehold strategy does not solve free-rider problems).  
 256. The SEC itself even noted this potential in the Rule 10b-13 adopting release. See 
10b-13 Release, supra note 51, at 83,708. See generally Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kra-
akman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. REV. 549 (1984) (discussing infor-
mational trading practices as fostering market efficiency). 
 257. A regime which allows for bidder toeholds is another way to compensate bidders 
for due diligence, reputational, and other bid-related investments in the face of an auction-
eering regime which encourages competing bids and limits the ability of lock-ups to provide 
such compensation. See generally Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Auctions and 
Sunk Costs in Tender Offers, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1982); Edith Hotchkiss et al., Holdups, 
Renegotiation, and Deal Protection in Mergers (July 2005), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=620442. But Professor Guhan Subramanian has found that em-
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 Bidder toeholds and off-market purchases, however, do have a potentially 
corrosive effect if the stake is significant.258 To dampen this possibility, a re-
laxation of these purchase rules could be combined with provisions similar to 
those in the U.K. Takeover Code which permit pre- and postannouncement pur-
chases but require the bidder to pay for a set period thereafter no less than that 
price paid for all subsequently acquired shares.259 Alternatively, the SEC could 
wholly deregulate and leave the possibility or actuality of bidder toeholds and 
postannouncement purchases to be regulated by targets through a low-
threshold poison pill or other takeover defenses as well as through bargain-
ing with potential bidders. 
 Finally, Rule 14e-5 has never applied to bar purchases while a merger trans-
action is pending.260 Presumably, this path dependency was set in 1969 because 
a bidder in a merger situation requires acquiree agreement; the acquiree can 
therefore contractually respond to and regulate this conduct. But whatever the 
reason, today a bidder who runs a proxy contest without a tender offer is per-
mitted postannouncement purchases during the contest.261 Unsolicited bidders 
will therefore initially characterize their offers as mergers in order to leave the 
option of such purchases. The result is preferential bias towards mergers over 
tender offers, discrimination which no longer seems sensical in a world where a 
takeover transaction will not succeed unless the original or replaced acquiree 
board agrees to it. Any prohibition on outside purchases should apply to both 
merger and tender offer structures or to neither.  
3.   Going-Privates 
 The federal going-private rules do not apply if stock consideration is offered 
instead of cash.262 The SEC-professed reason for this exception is that the pro-
tections of the going-private rules are unnecessary, since the minority stock-
holder continues to maintain an interest in the going-concern on an equal basis 
as the affiliated stockholders.263 The reasoning has always been tenuous, as the 
coercive elements of a going-private remain, no matter the form of considera-
                                                                                                                     
pirical evidence supports the conclusion that the Revlon auctioneering rule did not reduce 
bidder incentives to search. Subramanian, supra note 190, at 704-13. This may have been 
due to the use of lock-ups under Delaware law and the compensation they still provided 
with respect to bidder sunk costs.   
 258. Terence L. Blackburn, The Regulation of Market Sweeps in Connection with Ten-
der Offers, 58 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 619, 632 (1990) (arguing that market sweeps deny 
stockholders the opportunity present in a tender offer “to evaluate the likelihood of success 
of the tender offer on virtually a daily basis”). 
 259. See The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, THE CITY CODE ON TAKEOVERS AND 
MERGERS, at Rules 6 & 11 (2006) [hereinafter CITY CODE]. 
 260. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.14e-5 (2006). 
 261. In most cases, the acquiree will have the acquirer contractually agree to abstain 
from such purchases upon agreement to a merger. This is yet another argument for this 
prohibition to be one bargained between acquiree and acquirer.  
 262. See 17 C.F.R. § 230.13e-3(g)(2). 
 263. The SEC specifically stated in the Going-Private Adopting Release that it “be-
lieves that such transactions are also outside the purpose of Rule 13e-3 since all holders of 
that class of security are on an equal footing and are permitted to maintain an equivalent 
or enhanced equity interest.” Going-Private Adopting Release, supra note 68, at 82,127. 
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tion. The propriety of this exception is further suspect in the wake of the Pure 
Resources decision. Now, an acquirer, through a first step exchange offer struc-
ture, can exploit this federal loophole and side-step all of the prior requirements, 
both federal and state, for going-private transactions.264 Moreover, the further 
safeguard of dissenters’ rights is typically unavailable in stock-for-stock going-
private transactions.265 These likely were not consequences that the SEC ex-
pected when it promulgated its own federal regulation of going-privates.  
 More generally, the SEC going-private rules were issued after the Singer de-
cision.266 The SEC presumably structured its own archetype to work in tandem 
with this Delaware holding. Yet the Singer holding has been trimmed by the 
Delaware Supreme Court and largely gutted by Pure Resources.267 Moreover, 
Delaware has still yet to substantively address the re-emergent problems with 
management-sponsored buy-outs often made in tandem with, and financed by, 
private equity firms to the disadvantage of unaffiliated stockholders.  These de-
velopments, as well as the loophole noted above, arguably render outdated the 
current federal going-private rules. They no longer act to prevent and mitigate 
the abusive practices in going-privates in the manner in which they were ini-
tially intended. This is a claim supported by recent empirical findings that mi-
nority stockholders in going-privates receive lower compensation than they 
would in traditional corporate control transactions.268  Going-privates are thus 
an area ripe for the SEC to update its rules.  
4.   Other Examples 
 There are numerous other examples. The continued rationale for the prohibi-
tion on short and hedged tendering in partial offers is questionable in light of 
                                                                                                                     
 264. For a discussion of the Pure Resources holding, see supra notes 224-29 and accom-
panying text.  
 265. Delaware appraisal rights are generally unavailable to any stockholder in a 
merger or consolidation where the stock is either (1) listed on the stock exchange or quoted 
on an inter-dealer quotation system or (2) held of record by more than 2,000 holders and 
where the consideration is stock of the corporation surviving or resulting from such merger 
or consolidation. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262(b)(2)b (2006).  
 266. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text. 
 267. Here, the “trimming” I refer to is Weinberger’s limitation of the Singer test to the 
“entire fairness” prong. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1983). 
 268. See generally Subramanian, supra note 164 (arguing that Delaware law on going-
privates permits inefficient going-private transactions and deters efficient going-private 
transactions). In a companion piece, Professor Subramanian conducted an empirical study 
of the treatment of minority stockholders in tender offer and merger going-private transac-
tions. He found that minority stockholders receive a lower premium in going-private ten-
der offer transactions than in mergers. See Guhan Subramanian, Post-Siliconix Freezeouts: 
Theory, Evidence and Policy (Harv. L. Sch. John M. Olin Ctr. for L., Econ., & Bus., Discus-
sion Paper No. 472, 2004), available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/ 
olin_center/corporate_governance/papers.htm. Moreover, the arguable need for further 
regulation is supported by a recent study by Dealogic which found that “[t]he premium 
that management-led buyers paid to shareholders was, on average, just shy of 20 per-
cent . . . compared to the 27.5 percent average premium that shareholders received when a 
rival or a private equity firm unaffiliated with management was the buyer.” Andrew Ross 
Sorkin, Investors, Watch Your Wallets if Managers Lead the Buyout, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 
2006, at C33.  
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the current deeply liquid capital markets.269 SEC disclosure standards are argua-
bly not copious enough or require disclosure that is no longer appropriate or ap-
plicable to the present paradigm.270 Meanwhile, wholesale repeal of the all-
holders/best price rule may be appropriate in today’s takeover environment in 
order to permit transaction participants to order their own economic rights.271 
Alternatively, the all-holders/best price rule may be better extended to fully en-
compass the pre- and posttender offer periods.272 Finally, withdrawal rights are 
arguably unnecessary in a world where their coercive aspect can be regulated by 
targets and where irrevocable tenders can provide bidders flagship support in 
unsolicited transactions.273 These are four further instances, but, in light of 
modern developments and the cobwebs set upon federal takeover regulation, 
the validity of the entirety of Williams Act regulation is subject to scrutiny 
and questioning.  
B.   The Failure of Takeover Structure 
 The Williams Act is not the only feature of federal takeover regulation that 
has failed to keep abreast with the progress of takeovers. Indeed, the shifting le-
gal and structural landscape has arguably rendered obsolete the fundamental 
structure of federal takeover regulation.  
                                                                                                                     
 269. The SEC rules on short and hedged tendering, in particular, have continually 
been controversial, at one point prompting a rare dissent by an SEC Commissioner in favor 
of deregulation. See Short Tendering Release, supra note 112, at 86,715-17. Short and 
hedged tendering can create a more efficient market in preacquisition shares and result in 
an arbitrage preclose price for a transaction that is closer to reality. This provides price 
and liquidity benefits to nontendering stockholders that arguably outweigh the loss to ten-
dering stockholders who have fewer shares purchased. In light of the well-developed capi-
tal markets and arbitrage community present today it may be time to wholly deregulate 
short and hedged tendering.  
 270. For example, fairness opinions are increasingly controversial and SEC disclosure 
obligations on the subject increasingly inadequate—the impetus for pending NASD rules. 
See Steven M. Davidoff, Fairness Opinions, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 1557, 1595-98 (2006). 
 271. One commentator has cited the all-holders/best price rule as increasing the pres-
sure to tender because “tendering shareholder[s] [are] assured of receiving the highest 
price that the bidder might offer.” Richard A. Booth, The Problem with Federal Tender Of-
fer Law, 77 CAL. L. REV. 707, 713 (1989). Repeal of this rule would alter stockholder behav-
ior and possibly relieve this pressure. In such a circumstance, any further needed protec-
tion could then come from acquiree and acquirer negotiation or through increased stock-
holder collective action.  
 272. The issue here is the possibility of further bidder purchases at a premium that are 
not shared equally with other target stockholders who, due to the inherent coercive nature 
of tender offers, may not tender early. This is the prisoner’s dilemma. Their further dispa-
rate and uncoordinated nature does not permit them the ability to negotiate this right ex 
ante. But acquirees may negotiate this right in the face of a change in corporate control. 
See generally Subramanian, supra note 117, at 413 (proposing that stockholders “should 
replace their poison pills with a binding and enforceable agreement . . . to share any pre-
mium they receive in the context of a tender offer” in order to ensure sharing of any in-
creased or lower back-end premium).  
 273. Unlimited withdrawal rights also hasten stockholder tenders by reducing the risk 
of early tendering. By incentivizing stockholders to tender early, they make unattractive 
bids look better and more likely to succeed. Booth, supra note 271, at 714.  
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1.   Structural Incongruity 
 The stream of Delaware takeover decisions in the fourth and fifth waves has 
substantial implications for the structural focus of the federal takeover code. 
More specifically, the federal takeover code has traditionally had its locus in the 
Williams Act regulation of tender offers, with mergers regulated via the proxy 
rules. The SEC traditionally justified this distinction because mergers were 
viewed as being in lesser need of federal supervision. They were negotiated 
transactions between commercially sophisticated, reasonably equal parties; 
thus, the problematical, coercive aspects of tender offers were presumed ab-
sent.274 The initial federal regulatory focus upon tender offers was therefore ap-
propriate since in the 1960s the aforementioned target defense was unavailable 
in the case of tender offers.  
 This preference also comported with unsolicited bidders’ earlier penchant 
for tender offers over proxy contests.275 A tender offer is superior to a proxy 
contest since the bidder in a proxy contest must incur both the expense of the 
contest and the risk of complete defeat, whereas in a tender offer the bidder can 
condition its offer on the acquisition of a minimum number of shares which it 
can adjust as desirable. And historically, a bidder had a higher probability of 
success in a tender offer rather than a proxy contest due to “management’s well-
known dominance of the proxy machinery.”276  
 The existence of the poison pill and other takeover defenses has rendered 
this federal regulatory bias moot. A proxy contest is now the only viable way 
for a bidder to acquire a recalcitrant target.277 The tender offer alone can no 
longer achieve corporate control in such situations. Yet Delaware law forcefully 
acts to favor targets over bidders in proxy contests to the possible detriment of 
stockholder choice. Delaware permits adoption of a staggered board.278 This ar-
guably reduces the effectiveness of a proxy contest (and unsolicited bid), mak-
ing it unappealing to anyone but the most persistent, and perhaps irrational, bid-
der.279 Similarly, Delaware notice and director removal statutes further impede 
                                                                                                                     
 274. See Leebron, supra note 6, at 159-63 (discussing the structural relationship be-
tween the negotiated merger and the tender offer). 
 275. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text. 
 276. Fischel, supra note 246, at 7. 
 277. Recent successful examples of joint proxy contests and tender offers include 
BASF’s successful bid for Englehard and Oracle’s successful bid for Peoplesoft. See, e.g., 
Peter D. Lyons, Unsolicited, But Welcome, DAILY DEAL, July 25, 2006 (discussing BASF’s 
tender offer and proxy solicitation); Steve Lohr & Laurie J. Flynn, Oracle to Acquire Peo-
pleSoft for $10.3 Billion, Ending Bitter Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at C1 (discussing 
Oracle tender offer and proxy solicitation).  
 278. Corporations adopting a staggered board under Delaware law elect a fraction of 
their directors, usually one-third, each year to serve for a period of years, typically three. 
Thus, only a portion of the board can be replaced in any given year. See DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 8, § 141(d) (2006).  
 279. See generally Lucian Arye Bebchuk et al., The Powerful Antitakeover Force of 
Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 54 STAN L. REV. 887 (2002) (finding em-
pirical evidence that a staggered board has negative implications for corporate value). But 
see Mark Gordon, Takeover Defenses Work. Is That Such a Bad Thing?, 55 STAN L. REV. 
819 (2002) (challenging the study of Bebchuk et al. and arguing that the staggered board 
provides benefits that outweigh its cost). 
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the timing and feasibility of these contests. They permit Delaware targets to 
confine proxy contests to a singular time of year, the annual election of the tar-
get board elections.280  This provides ample time for targets to anticipate and 
counteract looming bids. The likely consequence of these Delaware laws is to 
deter proxy contests, resulting in fewer bids and adverse effects on the value of 
potential acquirees.  
 The paradigm shift in unsolicited takeovers to proxy contests implicates the 
entirety of the federal takeover code, including the proxy and tender offer pro-
cedural and substantive rules. In a world where the poison pill is permitted con-
tinued existence, it militates towards deregulation of tender offers combined 
with increased regulation and oversight of proxy contests.281 This appears par-
ticularly appropriate due to Delaware law’s prejudice with respect to proxy con-
tests. Yet on a microlevel, the SEC has not acted to revise or update the federal 
takeover rules to take this into account. Nor has the SEC considered the macro 
implications of this shift, including a changed regulatory focus and possible 
rulemaking action to restore a level playing field between bidders and targets in 
proxy contests for corporate control.  
2.   Structural Discrimination 
 Federal takeover law has traditionally distinguished in the scope and manner 
of its regulation of tender offers and mergers. However, the old, simplified rea-
son for this distinction—the ability of a bidder to implement an unsolicited offer 
without target consent—is no longer valid. The death of the true hostile, func-
tional requirement of target consent and other takeover developments has made 
many of these historical biases largely anomalous. More bluntly, there no 
longer appears to be any reason to continue the federal takeover code’s general, 
disparate treatment of the two structures.  
 The most glaring example of this unwarranted discrimination is the undue 
timing advantage tender offers have over mergers. Tender offers currently have 
a minimum offer period of twenty business days; this compares with a two- to 
three-month minimum period to complete a merger.282 Again, the justifications 
for this distinction appear no longer relevant in a world where acquiree consent 
is necessary, as the acquiree can negotiate its preferred takeover structure. One 
way to address this disconnect is to lengthen the tender offer period; perhaps an 
optimal result for the reasons discussed above. The other salve is obviously to 
shorten the merger period to bring it in line with the period for tender offers. 
This would require the SEC to revise Rule 14a-6 of the Exchange Act and for 
the SEC to reconsider its preclearance procedures for proxy statements before 
                                                                                                                     
 280. See Grundfest, supra note 206, at 860 n.6 (citations omitted). 
 281. Even the Delaware courts have made this shift and now increasingly act to regu-
late proxy contests rather than tender offers. The reemergence of the Blasius line of review 
in Liquid Audio is perhaps the most powerful example. See MM Cos. v. Liquid Audio, Inc., 
813 A.2d 1118 (Del. 2003). But the willingness of the Delaware courts to forcefully apply 
Unocal in the proxy contest paradigm is another. See, e.g., Omnicare, Inc. v. NCS Health-
care, 818 A.2d 914 (Del. 2003); Chesapeake Corp. v. Shore, 771 A.2d 293 (Del. Ch. 2000). 
 282. See generally LOU R. KLING & EILEEN T. NUGENT, NEGOTIATED ACQUISITIONS OF 
COMPANIES, SUBSIDIARIES AND DIVISIONS § 1.04[1][c][i] (2006). 
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mailing and solicitation of proxies.283 Depending upon the scope of revision it 
would also require the SEC to compel the stock exchanges to revise their own 
proxy solicitation regulation and preempt conflicting state laws.284 Ulti-
mately, whatever the direction of the cure, the point is that the original tim-
ing distinction under federal law for these two structures no longer exist and 
appear inappropriate.  
 There are other cases where this discrimination no longer appears sustain-
able in light of a target’s effective ability to control takeover structure. The fed-
eral disclosure requirements in mergers and tender offers are distinct, with vari-
ant and increased or lesser disclosure required for each.285 The propriety of this 
differentiation on the whole no longer seems apposite: full harmonization 
should be considered. Moreover, the all-holders/best price rule is applicable 
only to tender offers.286 There is no longer a reason for this. If the rule is main-
tained, application of the rule to merger transactions (or elimination in the case 
of tender offers) may be appropriate in order to stem the systematic bias that the 
rule, as currently interpreted, provides towards merger transaction.287 There is 
also the matter of bias under Rule 14e-5 discussed above. 
                                                                                                                     
 283. Rule 14a-6 requires that unless otherwise agreed by the SEC, “preliminary copies 
of the proxy statement and form of proxy shall be filed with the Commission at least 10 
calendar days prior to the date definitive copies of such material are first sent or given to 
security holders.” 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-6(a) (2006). The SEC will then decide whether to re-
view and comment upon such proxy statement. The definitive proxy statement together 
with a proxy cannot be mailed until cleared by the SEC. While a 1992 rule change permits 
a preliminary proxy to be mailed so long as a proxy card is not included, no acquirer would 
in practice do so, due to the continuing possibility of SEC review and comment. See gener-
ally Bernard S. Black, Next Steps in Proxy Reform, 18 J. CORP. L. 1 (1992).  
 284. For example, Delaware requires that due notice of a stockholder meeting and ac-
companying proxy be mailed at least 20 days prior to the vote on a merger transaction. 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c) (2006). Meanwhile, the NYSE recommends that a minimum 
of 30 days be allowed between the record and meeting dates. NYSE Listed Co. Manual § 
401.03 (2006).  Delaware also requires that the record date be no more than 60 nor less 
than 10 days before the date of such meeting. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 213(a) (2006). This 
minuet of time periods must be coordinated with any notice period for setting the record 
date as well as SEC timing restrictions.  
 285. A significant example is with fairness opinions. Federal securities law mandates 
disclosure of the analyses underlying a fairness opinion in a merger transaction but not a 
cash tender offer. There is no compelling reason for this disparity. See Davidoff, supra note 
270, at 1590-94. There are also significant unwarranted timing distinctions in the delivery 
of information. In a cash tender offer transaction, information is typically published in the 
tender offer document within 5-10 business days. In a merger, however, there is no public 
disclosure until the definitive proxy statement is mailed to stockholders 1-2 months later.  
 286. 17 C.F.R. § 230.14d-10 (2006).  
 287. The application of the all-holders/best price rule to tender offers and not mergers 
has historically created prejudice towards use of the merger structure. See generally David 
Marcus, Tender Returns, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 30, 2006 (stating that acquirers have “increas-
ingly opted to acquire targets by merger, where 14d-10 does not apply, rather than by ten-
der offer”). The reason is that courts have broadly interpreted the meaning of a tender offer 
to arguably encompass change of control and other payments to executives in connection 
with the transaction. See generally Ben Walther, Note, Employment Agreements and Ten-
der Offers: Reforming the Problematic Treatment of Severance Plans Under Rule 14d-10, 
102 COLUM. L. REV. 774, 779-801 (2002) (outlining the divergent judicial opinions on the 
scope of Rule 14d-10 and its potential application to change-of-control compensation). But 
there has been no bright-line test annunciated for when these payments are so deemed in-
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C.   The Failure to Regulate Takeovers 
 Meanwhile, it is not just a matter of federal takeover laws that arguably have 
become obsolete. In the SEC’s absence, a number of emergent and festering 
takeover issues remain unaddressed. These are areas of national import within 
the current regulatory purview of the SEC that the SEC has chosen through in-
action not to regulate. I point out two of the more significant ones here. 
1.   Change of Control Compensation 
 Officers and other executive employees of an acquiree are often compen-
sated in takeovers over and above the consideration paid to unaffiliated acquiree 
stockholders.288 The debate over this change of control compensation has been 
heated and prevalent. Some commentators have forcefully argued in favor of 
this compensation, asserting that it better aligns management and stockholder 
interests by shifting risk and incentivizing management to negotiate and accept 
takeover bids that might hurt their own pecuniary interests but otherwise benefit 
stockholders.289 Furthermore, in light of the ability for directors suborned by 
management to effectively block or impede takeovers, the need for this carrot is 
self-evident. The converse argument decries this compensation as a rent extrac-
                                                                                                                     
cluded. Nonetheless, if a court makes this finding it will then order the acquirer to pay this 
differential compensation to all acquiree stockholders. This is a risk that an acquirer 
wishes to avoid—hence the historical bias towards mergers. See generally Michael D. 
Ebert, Comment, “During the Tender Offer” (or Some Other Time Near It): Insider Transac-
tions Under the All Holders/Best Price Rule, 47 VILL. L. REV. 677 (2002); Jason K. Zachary, 
Love Me Tender, Love Me True: Compensating Management and Shareholders Under the 
“All-Holders/Best-Price” Rule, 31 SEC. REG. L.J. 81 (2003). The SEC recently adopted new 
regulations to address this issue. Amendments to the Tender Offer Best-Price Rules, Ex-
change Act Release No. 34-54684, [2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,511 
(Nov. 1, 2006). But the ultimate regulations adopted by the SEC would still potentially act 
to prohibit this change of control compensation and preserve this bias. See Amendments to 
the Tender Offer Best-Price Rule, Exchange Act Release No. 52,968, [2005 Transfer 
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 82,772 (Dec. 23, 2005) (stating that “[w]e believe, how-
ever, that it would be inappropriate to limit the application of the best-price rule to a spe-
cific time frame”). The argument for not applying these rules to merger transaction is 
tenuous at best. Until the SEC applies this rule to both structures or curtails or repeals the 
scope of the rule, acquirers will still tend to favor merger transactions.  
 288. This benefit most commonly takes the form of “golden parachutes,” accelerated 
option vesting, and other compensation mechanisms which award executives upon a 
change in control of the corporation. The disproportionate gain can also take the form of 
employment or consulting arrangements, noncompetition agreements, or other future 
benefits provided by the acquirer to the acquiree’s management.  
 289. This benefit also serves as a compensatory mechanism: the change of control 
payments recompense for the manager’s lost investment of time and resources. There is 
also the base argument that they serve as a form of takeover defense. See generally Rich-
ard P. Bress, Note, Golden Parachutes: Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L. REV. 955, 
955-63 (1987) (discussing the justification and structure of golden parachutes); Kenneth C. 
Johnsen, Comment, Golden Parachutes and the Business Judgment Rule: Toward a Proper 
Standard of Review, 94 YALE L.J. 909, 915-18 (1985). Another justification for these pay-
ments is that they reduce the corporation’s ex ante compensation costs, shifting them to a 
prospective acquirer and thereby increasing the value of the corporation if no takeover ever 
occurs. Alternatively, the compensation burden is shifted to an acquirer through a possible 
higher takeover premium. See Albert Choi, Golden Parachute as a Compensation-Shifting 
Mechanism, 20 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 170, 183-84 (2004). 
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tion, money pick-pocketed from unaffiliated stockholders. Officers are subject 
to fiduciary duties, and, accordingly, their duties should be to the stockholders; 
payment of this compensation is therefore wholly inappropriate and unneces-
sary. Moreover, these payments create a perverse incentive whereby the man-
ager can be induced to drive down the acquiree share price in order to encour-
age a takeover.290 Change of control payments should therefore arguably be 
banned or subject to approval (precatory or otherwise) by stockholders.  
 The sums involved are numerically, if not relatively, large. A recent study of 
change of control payments to Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) found that 
CEOs, on average, accrue $8 to $12 million in change of control compensation 
triggered by a takeover.291 This is an average—there are instances of much lar-
ger amounts. In 2005, James Kilts, CEO of Gillette, became entitled to $165 
million in change of control payments when Proctor & Gamble acquired Gil-
lette.292 In 2006, Bruce Hammonds, CEO of MBNA, accrued $102 million in 
compensation when MBNA was acquired by Bank of America.293 Indeed, recent 
outcries over excessive executive pay include similar complaints about ubiqui-
tous and inordinate change of control payments.294 The value of these payments 
has also become more suspect since a recent study found that when CEOs do 
receive extraordinary treatment through change of control compensation, the 
stockholders of the acquiree actually receive lower acquisition premia.295 The 
arguments that change of control payments are worthwhile since they reduce 
agency costs and ultimately benefit acquiree stockholders through a higher 
premium now appear less firm.  
 The SEC has not addressed this issue in any substantive manner, although it 
recently adopted increased disclosure requirements for change of control ar-
rangements as part of an over-all review of executive compensation disclo-
sure.296 Meanwhile, the Delaware courts and other potential regulators have re-
fused to inject themselves into the debate concerning the appropriateness of 
these payments.297 The large sums involved, the public discontent, and the bias 
(or arguable benefit) that these payments potentially inject into the takeover 
                                                                                                                     
 290. See generally Bress, supra note 289, at 961-62 (discussing criticism of golden 
parachutes); Johnson, supra note 289, at 918-23 (rejecting arguments that criticize golden 
parachutes and arguing that the benefits of these arrangements outweigh their costs).  
 291. Jay C. Hartzell et al., What’s in It for Me? CEOs Whose Firms Are Acquired, 17 
REV. OF FIN. STUD. 37, 39 (2004). See also Craig E. Lefanowicz et al., Golden Parachutes 
and Managerial Incentives in Corporate Acquisitions: Evidence from the 1980s and 1990s, 
6 J. CORP. FIN. 215 (2000).  
 292. Gordon Platt, Going for Gold, GLOBAL FIN., Mar. 2006, at 18. 
 293. Id. 
 294. See, e.g., Ron Orol, Those Parachutes: Just How Golden?, DAILY DEAL, Jan. 18, 
2006. 
 295. See Hartzell, supra note 291, at 39. 
 296. See Executive Compensation and Related Person Disclosure, Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 54,302, [2006 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 87,620 (Aug. 11, 2006). 
 297. The Delaware Supreme Court recently showed its bias against questioning these 
types of payments in the Disney case when it held that the payment of $130 million sever-
ance package paid to Michael Ovitz did not constitute a breach of the board’s fiduciary du-
ties. See In re Walt Disney Co. Derivative Litig., 906 A.2d 27 (Del. 2006). 
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system make this an area that is clearly open for SEC investigation, study, and 
perhaps substantive or procedural rulemaking.  
2.   Due Diligence and Disclosure 
 Due diligence by prospective and actual acquirers is a murky and lightly 
regulated area raising three complex issues. The first is one of bidder equality. 
The U.K. Takeover Code requires that a prospective acquiree provide equal and 
prompt informational access to all prospective bidders.298 The federal takeover 
code has no such rule of equality or any other explicit rule governing bidder 
(prospective or otherwise) access to information. Consequently, acquirees can 
discriminate among bidders in the provision of information.299 This can lead to 
favoritism and reduced opportunities for competing, higher bids due to informa-
tion inequality and asymmetry.  
 The second issue is one of stockholder equality. Regulation FD prohibits se-
lective disclosure: generally speaking, when a corporation discloses material, 
nonpublic information it must make public disclosure of that information.300 
However, Regulation FD does not apply to bidder due diligence.301 Thus, a pro-
spective bidder can obtain access to an acquiree’s nonpublic information 
through the due diligence process. It can then decide, based on this information, 
whether to bid or not to bid. But if the bidder chooses not to bid, the nonpublic 
material information provided to the bidder is not required to be publicly dis-
closed. A prospective bidder therefore receives an informational advantage over 
ordinary stockholders who do not receive access to this material when making 
their own purchase decisions. 
 Finally, there is a third issue raised by acquirer receipt of acquiree informa-
tion when the acquirer does decide to agree to a transaction. The disclosure re-
quirements for acquirer due diligence in this circumstance are generally gov-
erned by the federal securities law antifraud strictures.302 Beyond this, the SEC 
has not annunciated specific requirements for disclosure related to information 
supplied to acquirers by acquirees in the diligence process. Accordingly, the pa-
rameters of required disclosure are vague and acquirers tend to under-disclose 
                                                                                                                     
 298. CITY CODE, supra note 259, at Rule 20.2. 
 299. This discrimination is permitted under Delaware law if the board has a reason-
able belief that it will serve the interests of acquiree stockholders. See, e.g., In re J.P. Ste-
vens & Co., S’holders Litig., 542 A.2d 770, 781-83 (Del. Ch. 1988). 
 300. 17 C.F.R. §§ 243.100-.103 (2006). 
 301. Regulation FD by its terms does not apply to the extent the recipient agrees to 
maintain the disclosed information in confidence. Id. § 243.100. In addition, Regulation FD 
does not apply to any disclosure made in connection with a business combination involving 
the offering of securities registered under the Securities Act. Id. §§ 243.100-.102. 
 302. These rules generally prohibit material misstatements and omissions in connec-
tion with the purchase or sale of securities. Potentially applicable rules are section 10(b) of 
the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000), and Rule 10b-5 thereunder, 17 C.F.R. § 
240.10b-5 (2006) (general purchases and sales); section 14E of the Exchange Act and Regu-
lation 14E thereunder, 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (2000) (tender offers) and Rule 14E thereunder, 
17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-1 to -8 (2006); section 18 of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 73f (2000) 
(documents filed with the SEC); Rule 13e-3(b)(1) under the Exchange Act, 17 C.F.R. § 
243.13e-3(b)(1) (2006) (going-private transactions); and Rule 14a-9 under the Exchange 
Act, 17 C.F.R. § 243.14a-9 (2006) (proxy statements).  
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information received through the due diligence process. For example, projec-
tions relied upon by acquirers are often not disclosed or are disclosed in a sum-
marized and rarely useful form.303 Contrast this with the U.K. rule which re-
quires all assumptions underlying disclosed projections to be specifically stated 
and the policies and calculations supporting them to be examined and reported 
upon by the acquiree’s accountants.304  
 Bidder due diligence, accordingly, raises a number of disclosure and equal-
ity issues that arguably adversely affect acquiree stockholders and the overall 
economic efficiency of the takeover process. Yet SEC regulation of, let alone 
attention to, these issues has been largely absent. This is mirrored in the state 
courts, which have also directed scant attention to the issues arising from bidder 
due diligence. Accordingly, further SEC examination and study of this area is 
appropriate and follow-up federal regulation should be considered.  
D.   The Failure of Delaware 
 Finally, there is the deus ex machina, the Delaware courts. Issues that were 
previously the concern of the SEC are now primarily, if not entirely, regulated 
by the Delaware courts.305 Delaware now acts alone in takeover standards and 
takeover defenses. Moreover, the positions of the Delaware court on these is-
sues during the 1990s through today are markedly different than those of the 
fourth wave—an era of SEC engagement.  
 The modern-day takeover code engendered by this sea change is not neces-
sarily the one that the SEC, had it been so engaged, would have fashioned or 
permitted. It is, of course, mere speculation to consider the type of regulation or 
other pressure that the SEC would have brought to bear, if any, on these issues 
as well as the effect any such ex ante influencing acts might have had on these 
Delaware court decisions. However, Delaware’s current regulation of takeover 
defenses, at least, is largely contrary to the SEC’s 1980s preferences.306 Simi-
larly, in going-privates and transaction defenses, the Delaware courts have acted 
contrarily, or not at all, on issues of prior SEC focused concern.307   
 The Delaware courts have largely acted in all these areas to circumscribe 
stockholder protection and choice.308 This is a specific SEC interest in takeover 
regulation. Moreover, the Delaware-built takeover code is arguably adverse to 
                                                                                                                     
 303. See, e.g., Guidant Corp., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 70 
(Mar. 1, 2006) (noting exchange of projections but failing to disclose figures disclosed to ac-
quirer); Gillette Co., Definitive Proxy Statement (Form DEFM14A), at 41 (May 25, 2005) 
(noting exchange of projections but disclosing as material only projected growth rates for 
sales, profits from operations and earnings). 
 304. CITY CODE, supra note 259, at Rule 28. 
 305. The Delaware courts are also increasingly encroaching into the regulation of gov-
erning standards in takeover disclosure documents, previously the terrain of the SEC. See, 
e.g., Alessi v. Beracha, 849 A.2d 939 (Del. Ch. 2004) (denying motion to dismiss complaint 
premised on nondisclosure of takeover discussions); In re Pure Resources, Inc. S’holders 
Litig., 808 A.2d 421 (Del. Ch. 2002) (holding analyses underlying fairness opinion required to be 
disclosed in tender offer documents despite lack of similar federal disclosure requirement). 
 306. See supra Part II. 
 307. See supra Part II.  
 308. See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text. 
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other broader, national SEC interests. At a minimum, it is inapposite to the 
level-playing-field precepts embodied in Williams Act. Moreover, the Delaware 
takeover code discriminates to the preservation of management discretion.309 
This is anathema to the SEC’s historical goal of stockholder protection and 
autonomy.310 This bias also fosters management entrenchment and exacer-
bates agency costs. This is inefficient and likely on the whole detrimental to 
the national economy.311   
 The SEC is therefore arguably obligated to shift the course and promulgate 
correcting regulation to the current Delaware-erected takeover code. This is not 
a question of federalism, the internal affairs doctrine, or whether the SEC 
should act beyond its current regulatory authority or even propose legislation to 
do so. The possibility of more sweeping action will be discussed in Part VI.C. 
Rather, this is a question similar to that posed when the SEC trumped Dela-
ware’s holding in Unocal on stockholder equality grounds by adopting the all-
holders rule.312 Should the SEC fulfill its regulatory mandate, respond to and 
protect its constituencies and interests, and, in doing so, act to modify the take-
over code promulgated by Delaware? The underlying premise here is that the 
national takeover code structured by the Delaware courts in the SEC absence is 
not an optimal one for the nation and is adverse not only to the congressional 
intent underlying federal securities regulation but also is contrary to the SEC’s 
congressionally mandated role in the regulation of takeovers. If this is true, the 
federal takeover code is ripe for an update to cure these Delaware-induced defi-
ciencies. In fact, the SEC is obligated to take such steps.  
VI.   A RETURN OF FEDERAL TAKEOVER REGULATION 
A.   A Reexamination of Federal Takeover Regulation 
 We have now seen that the consequence of the SEC absence is an obsoles-
cent federal takeover code and suboptimal regulation of takeovers by the Dela-
                                                                                                                     
 309. See supra Part IV.  
 310. See supra note 167 and accompanying text.  
 311. There is a wealth of literature finding adverse economic effects resulting from the 
adoption of takeover and transaction defenses. See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 279 
(finding empirical evidence that adoption of a staggered board reduces stockholder wealth); 
P.R. Chandy et al., The Shareholder Wealth Effects of the Pennsylvania Fourth Generation 
Anti-Takeover Law, 32 AM. BUS. L.J. 399, 401 & n.14 (1995) (citing studies finding adverse 
economic effects surrounding the adoption of antitakeover devices); Coates & Subrama-
nian, supra note 212, at 347 (finding empirical support for increased rates of takeover 
completion in the presence of lock-ups). But see John C. Coffee Jr., The Uncertain Case for 
Takeover Reform: An Essay on Stockholders, Stakeholders and Bust-ups, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 
435, 437 n.7 (presenting a review of the conflicting conclusions of studies measuring the ef-
fect of the passage of stakeholder, or constituency, statute legislation); Lawrence D. Brown 
& Marcus L. Caylor, Corporate Governance and Firm Performance (2004) (citing empirical 
evidence to suggest that firms with antitakeover provisions, among other governance fea-
tures, show greater returns over three-, five-, and ten-year periods than companies without 
comparable provisions), available at http://www.issproxy.com/pdf/Corporate%20Govern-
ance%20Study%201.04.pdf. See also Romano, supra note 135, at 113 (stating that state 
takeover statutes are “troublesome, for they can produce results that are inconsistent with 
the core goal of corporation law—the maximization of equity share prices”).   
 312. See supra notes 151-53 and accompanying text. 
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ware courts. The magnitude of these deficiencies alone argues for more than 
tinkering; rather a wholesale reexamination of the federal takeover code. How-
ever, there are other reasons for such a step. First, the federal takeover code was 
largely erected through one-off, SEC rulemaking. The result is a patchwork 
quilt of a federal takeover code. It is time to examine the various interlocking 
pieces—how they work together as well as individually. Second, the wholesale 
shift in takeover law, structures, tactics and strategy require that the entire fed-
eral takeover code be attuned to these changes. Third, a takeover code is an in-
terconditional and interdependent beast, and, as singular changes may implicate 
further revision, any reexamination of a rule should occur in the context of the 
whole.313  
 There is also a trove of information and experience available to the SEC to 
inform such a reexamination; resources that were nonexistent when the SEC 
was last active. For example, the takeover systems outside the United States— 
Europe, Japan, and Australia, in particular—have substantially developed since 
the fourth wave and provide much experiential data.314 Then there is the learn-
ing garnered from the United States.315 Moreover, research in the takeover field 
has blossomed; pioneering studies of takeover defenses, transaction defenses, 
bidder and target tactics and strategies, other takeover rules as well as compara-
tive work on takeover codes, and study of the structure of the takeover itself are 
now available.316 The emergence of this constellation of resources also supports 
a reexamination of the federal takeover code.  
 This reexamination should not merely focus on restitching the frayed patch-
work quilt. If there is a singular lesson to be learned from the takeover story of 
the past forty years, it is that takeover structures hurriedly evolve—more 
quickly than regulators, burdened by the rulemaking process, can respond. In 
order to forestall repeated obsolescence and the recurrence of piecemeal regula-
tion, the SEC should consider formalizing the shadow principles which have 
previously guided its takeover rulemaking.317 These include the principles of a 
                                                                                                                     
 313. For example, if withdrawal rights are maintained, then elimination of Rule 14e-5 
may be appropriate. If they are eliminated, then the original purpose for Rule 14e-5 is 
again present and Rule 14e-5 may still be necessary. See supra Part V.A.2. 
 314. For recent comparative review of these takeover codes, see generally CHRISTIN M. 
FORSTINGER, TAKEOVER LAW IN THE EU AND THE USA: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS (2002); 
Curtis J. Milhaupt, In the Shadow of Delaware? The Rise of Hostile Takeovers in Japan, 
105 COLUM. L. REV. 2171 (2005); Geoffrey Miller, Political Structure and Corporate Gov-
ernance: Some Points of Contrast Between the United States and England, 1998 COLUM. 
BUS. L. REV. 52; Paul von Nessen, The Americanization of Australian Corporate Law, 26 
SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM. 239, 259-62 (1999).  
 315.  See supra Parts II-IV. See generally George Bittlingmayer, The Market for Corpo-
rate Control (Including Takeovers) (Mar. 18, 1998), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=81808. 
 316. For a brief survey of these developments, see generally Gregg A. Jarrell et al., The 
Market for Corporate Control: Empirical Evidence Since 1980, 2 J. ECON. PERSP. 49 (1988); 
Michael C. Jensen & Donald H. Chew, U.S. Corporate Governance: Lessons from the 1980s 
(1995), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=146150; Roberta Romano, A Guide to Take-
overs: Theory, Evidence, and Regulation, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 119 (1992).  
 317. A principle-based takeover code would set forth the general principles underlying 
the takeover code. The regulator and participants would then act under the “spirit” of 
these principles and the detailed rules which would be promulgated thereunder to provide 
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level playing field vis-à-vis bidders and targets and the goal of stockholder pro-
tection and decisional primacy.318 If the SEC adopts this course, it should enable 
it to respond more quickly to individual developments through application of 
principles rather than the several-year rulemaking process.319 It will also have 
the virtue of dictating a logically coherent federal takeover code, one which has 
internal order to its promulgated rules.  
 Ultimately, though, the product of such review is not this Article’s topic. I 
believe that such a review will bring to bear the SEC’s national interests to con-
clude that the federal takeover code today is not right for the day.320 But it may 
not. The result will depend upon selection of first principles, the appropriate-
ness of one-off regulation, perception of current deficits, the current scope of 
regulatory authority, political and interest group considerations and other vaga-
ries of the regulatory process.321 These make it difficult if not impossible to pre-
dict the exact outcome. However, without such a review we will not have the 
benefits of a systemwide reexamination, let alone a fix for any current dysfunc-
tion. The requirement and results of a review are therefore not outcome deter-
minative to the extent the benefits of comprehensive analysis prevail.  
 Nor do I presume that such SEC reexamination will produce the results nec-
essarily wanted by the SEC or otherwise generate unbiased, economically effi-
cient regulation. The SEC rulemaking review and regulatory process is not a 
perfect one.322 However, the SEC has historically maintained a sufficient dis-
                                                                                                                     
specific direction. The principles would be articulated in open terms and therefore would 
be observed in both generalities and specifics. The U.K. Takeover Code is a model of one 
such code. See CITY CODE, supra note 259. 
 318. See supra note 167 and accompanying text. There are others, such as the one of 
equal opportunity, undergirding the all-holders/best price rules and the going-private rule. 
See John C. Coffee, Jr., Transfers of Control and the Quest for Efficiency: Can Delaware 
Law Encourage Efficient Transactions While Chilling Inefficient Ones?, 21 DEL. J. CORP. L. 
359, 371-77 (1996). There is also the self-evident principle of the efficiency of the national 
capital markets. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2000) (requiring that the SEC “consider, in addi-
tion to the protection of investors, whether the action will promote efficiency, competition 
and capital formation”).  
 319. This could be implemented in part through a process that exists in the U.K. 
whereby participants regularly communicate with the Takeover Panel on issues of uncer-
tainty.  
 320. Moreover, an important driver in this conclusion is that the bulk of the available 
studies show that takeover transactions are, in general, wealth-creating. See Ronald J. 
Gilson, Lipton and Rowe’s Apologia for Delaware: A Short Reply, 27 DEL. J. CORP. L. 37, 
40-48 (2002); Jensen & Chew, supra note 316, at 6-7; Roberta Romano, supra note 316, at 
124 n.13. See generally Henry G. Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 
J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).  
 321. See generally Marc I. Steinberg, The Securities and Exchange Commission’s Ad-
ministrative, Enforcement, and Legislative Programs and Policies—Their Influence on Cor-
porate Internal Affairs, 58 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 173 (1982) (discussing the various influ-
ences and process of SEC rulemaking).  
 322. However, the SEC is generally held in high esteem for its processes and output. 
See Robert A. Prentice, The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 800 
(2006) (stating that “most commentators consider the SEC an extremely successful regula-
tor”); David L. Ratner, The SEC at Sixty: A Reply to Professor Macey, 16 CARDOZO L. REV. 
1765, 1779 (1995) (“The SEC is one important reason why the securities industry is in so 
much better shape than other financial service industries, and why U.S. securities markets 
are the best securities markets in the world.”). But see Langevoort, supra note 167, at 529 
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tance from industry and avoided capture, such that the chance of industry-
biased regulation is low.323 The bias, if anything, is more towards inertia; how-
ever, when the SEC acts in takeovers it focuses on its own regulatory interests, 
its shadow principles.324 Therefore, from a historical perspective, action is the 
primary issue, not product.  
 There is still the question of congressional influence on any review and in 
the implementation thereof. Congress is capricious and acts within a wider po-
litical sphere.325 If the SEC revisions require legislation, such laws may not pass 
in the desired SEC form or even at all.326 Professor Roberto Romano, for exam-
ple, has argued that congressional intervention and complete federalization of 
corporate law is undesirable since it is likely to produce more restrictive limita-
tions on takeovers than those placed by the states.327  
 In order to stem these influences, the SEC should take steps to insulate any 
review from politics by channeling it through a specially appointed apolitical 
committee akin to the Advisory Committee. Moreover, congressional involve-
ment can likely be forestalled through aggressive interpretation within the cur-
rent regulatory framework. This has been a course the SEC has taken before 
with takeover regulation.328 Furthermore, more radical reform can also be 
implemented through SEC-mandated regulation via stock exchange rulemaking.329  
                                                                                                                     
(arguing that the SEC’s takeover regulation is the result of organizational behavior con-
cerned with internal self-serving goals); Jonathan R. Macey, Administrative Agency Obso-
lescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 909, 948 (1994) (concluding that “[t]he SEC’s major litigation efforts and regulatory 
initiatives have been designed to protect the Commission’s regulatory turf, rather than to 
further important areas of public policy”); A.C. Pritchard, The SEC at 70: Time for Retire-
ment?, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1101 (2005) (arguing that the SEC is “ ‘independent’ 
in name only” and beholden to Congress such that “the SEC—under the watchful eye of 
Congress—has fueled the cyclical swings in regulatory policy as a means of gaining addi-
tional authority and budgetary support”). See generally ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY 
PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA (1982). 
 323. See SELIGMAN, supra note 16, at xix (“Few have suggested seriously that the SEC 
has been a ‘captive’ of the industries it regulates . . . . [S]uch a suggestion cannot be sus-
tained by a reasonable reading of the Commission’s history.”) 
 324. See Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 
STAN. L. REV. 1, 20-36 (2003).  
 325. See generally Roe, supra note 2, at 596-98. 
 326. This was the unfortunate case with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. This legislation is 
seen by many commentators as rulemaking by Congress, over SEC objections, which pro-
duced inefficient and unproductive results. See Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
and the Making of Quack Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1595-97 (2005). 
 327. See Romano, supra note 101, at 503. See also Jonathan R. Macey, Displacing 
Delaware: Can the Feds Do a Better Job than the States in Regulating Takeovers?, 57 BUS. 
LAW. 1025 (2002); Mary E. Kostel, Note, A Public Choice Perspective on the Debate over 
Federal Versus State Corporate Law, 79 VA. L. REV. 2129, 2129 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he 
history and effects of the Williams Act suggest that federal regulation is unlikely to moni-
tor better the behavior of corporate management in the gaps where the market for corpo-
rate control fails”). 
 328. The adoption of the all-holders/best price rule, going-private rules, and rules re-
quiring mandatory withdrawal rights through an offer period are prominent examples. See 
supra notes 56-70, 151-53 and accompanying text.  
 329. The SEC took this route in prohibiting midstream dual-class stock recapitaliza-
tions through stock exchange rulemaking after the SEC’s own rule was struck down by the 
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 In the end, the risk of a deficient or ham-fisted regulatory takeover code is 
certainly present. Yet this is counterbalanced by the deep flaws in the current 
regime and the consequent need for a wholesale reexamination and reform. The 
weight tips in this favor.  
B.   The Return of the SEC 
 Even if there is a wholesale update of the federal takeover code, the re-
quirement of an active SEC within this context is a paramount goal in and of it-
self. The initial reason for this is practical; if the SEC does not tend to its take-
over law, it will again quickly become outdated. Weeds grow in an uncared for 
lawn. This is true even if a principle-based takeover code is put forth, as spe-
cific enforcement, interpretation, and regulatory action under such rules remains 
necessary. Moreover, an active SEC will be better positioned to incorporate re-
search and other practical experience as it unfolds.  
 An engaged SEC also provides positive force in a world where Delaware is 
now the primary takeover regulator. In the 1970s and 1980s takeover regulation 
was arguably an SEC game and many of the prostockholder decisions of the 
Delaware courts, including Singer, Unocal, and Revlon were arguably crafted in 
response to SEC pressure or the threat of SEC intervention.330 However, in the 
1990s the evaporation of the SEC exigent pressure led the Delaware courts to 
veer sharply promanagement.331 
 There is a lesson here. Throughout the contemporary history of takeovers, 
an active SEC has tempered the promanagement interests of Delaware. First, 
when Delaware or another state has leaned too far against federal interests, the 
SEC has acted to trump this conduct.332 Second, the Delaware courts appear to 
be acutely aware of this real or potential federal action, and under this specter 
decide their cases in greater alignment with federal interests.333 This threat of 
active intercession tames Delaware’s promanagement bias.334 The SEC presence 
alone is therefore a powerful mitigating device to ensure that the takeover code 
produced by the Delaware courts is one keyed to national needs.335  
                                                                                                                     
courts. See generally Bainbridge, supra note 117. See also Goldberg, supra note 241, at 235 
(arguing for wholesale reform of the federal takeover code through “revision or imaginative 
application of section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, or by adoption and en-
forcement by the stock exchange of effective self-regulatory rules”).  
 330. See supra Parts II.B & II.C. 
 331. See Sean J. Griffith, Daedalean Tinkering, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1247, 1263 (2006) 
(“[W]hen the threat of federal preemption had faded . . . [c]ourts began to apply Unocal less 
aggressively and to narrow Revlon but, by retaining the principle of intermediate scrutiny, 
never to the point at which other states could steal incorporations by appealing to share-
holders.”). 
 332. This occurred in the case of first generation takeover statutes and the exclusion-
ary self-tender. See supra notes 87, 132-34, 151-53 and accompanying text.  
 333. See supra notes 3, 236.  
 334. See generally Note, The Case for Federal Threats in Corporate Governance, 118 
HARV. L. REV. 2726, 2726 (2005) (arguing that the “federal government threatening inter-
vention [would] . . . prompt states to adopt more desirable rules”). 
 335. See Roe, supra note 12, at 2502-04; see also McDonnell, supra note 12, at 136. 
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 Concomitant to this point, the SEC is a national regulator. The SEC takes 
into account national interests rather than the narrow ones that Delaware acts 
upon.336 Historically, SEC regulation is likely to be prostockholder and in favor 
of rules that promote efficient national and international markets.337 Moreover, 
as Professor Roe has argued, the federal government can crush Delaware and 
represents a wider divergence of interests. If Delaware goes too far in represent-
ing its special interests to the detriment of those represented at the higher, fed-
eral level, the federal government will intervene.338 Compare this to Delaware’s 
regulation which has tended towards rules that on their face favor manager de-
cisional autonomy and entrenchment to the detriment of stockholders.339 Placed 
in a historical context, the SEC not only tempers Delaware but is more apt to 
enact a takeover code beneficial to the nation as a whole.  
 The SEC can also bring to bear capabilities as a national regulator that the 
Delaware courts or any other state regulator cannot. First, when the SEC acts, it 
acts nationally, and there is contiguity that no other state actor, even Delaware, 
can provide. Second, the SEC has the resources of the federal government at its 
disposal. The SEC can use these to support research, review developments, and 
continually study issues. It has superior personnel quality and numbers and con-
sequently more capacity for enforcement action and regulation. Third, the SEC 
has a voice that speaks at a national level and with more focus and influence 
than any state actor.340   
 Finally, the SEC regulates in a manner wholly different than the nation’s 
current takeover regulator, the Delaware courts. The SEC promulgates and en-
forces a rule-based takeover code, whereas Delaware regulates by court deci-
sion. There are benefits and deficits to both types of regulation. However, rule-
based regulation is produced through a responsive deliberative process that in-
volves a comment period and public input. It is consequently more nuanced, 
targeted, and globally consistent than regulation issued on a case-by-case ba-
sis.341 It is not burdened by the Delaware courts’ limitation of rulemaking based 
on the cases and underlying facts before it. In the instance of Delaware, this 
limitation is illustrated by the Delaware courts’ tendency towards schizophrenic 
standards and haphazard enforcement.342 While there are also arguments in fa-
vor of judicial takeover codes—they are arguably more flexible in responding 
                                                                                                                     
 336. See Roe, supra note 12, at 2505-08. 
 337. This is confirmed by the historical discussion in Part II, supra.  
 338. Roe, supra note 12, at 2505-08. 
 339. See supra notes 230-36 and accompanying text. Delaware’s interests include cor-
porate managers who make the incorporation decision and the others in Delaware who 
benefit, the Delaware bar and its citizens. The stockholder interest is a diluted one since 
the choice for incorporation, the primary driver of Delaware’s interests, is largely a man-
agement one. Delaware courts therefore arguably have an incentive to favor managers over 
stockholders. See Roe, supra note 12, at 2502-04. 
 340. See generally Prentice, supra note 322, at 801-03. 
 341. Id.  
 342. See generally Richard E. Kihlstrom & Michael L. Wachter, Corporate Policy and 
the Coherence of Delaware Takeover Law, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 523 (2003). 
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to changes in public mood, for example—a rule-based takeover code offers 
benefits that a case-based one inarguably cannot.343  
 Thus, there are clear national benefits to an active, engaged SEC. These 
benefits, however, do not mean that the ultimate product will be a beneficial 
and economic takeover code. This is due to an effect that countervailing forces, 
such as Congress and other federal bodies, may have on further, engaged regu-
lation. It also may be due to internal workings or failures of the SEC. Yet an ac-
tive SEC within the parameters of its rulemaking purview is what is being dis-
cussed here. This Article does not call for an engaged Congress—rather, an en-
gaged SEC. While again there are risks of regulatory capture and misregulation, 
the history of the SEC’s takeover regulation outlined in this Article leads one to 
conclude that it would take a measured approach to issues that arguably favored 
stockholders and national interests—as occurred in the 1960s through the 
1980s.344 And, in the absence of scandal or public furor, Congress has largely 
left the SEC to regulate without interference.345 There is no reason to think this 
would be different in the future.  
C.   Towards Refederalization? 
 The return of the SEC as an active regulator and a wholesale update to fed-
eral takeover regulation leads to the natural question of whether this will result 
in the takeover code’s complete federalization. This would rather be refederali-
zation, since, as we have seen, takeovers prior to the mid-1970s were strictly a 
federal concern. Nonetheless, I do not think that this will occur or is appropriate 
for a number of reasons.  
 First, federalization would take congressional lawmaking. While incre-
mental legislative and regulatory federalization is certainly possible and likely if 
this Article’s call is successful, again, Congress is unlikely to approve whole-
sale federalization without some public outcry or scandal to motivate it.346 Thus 
practically, federalizing legislation is an outlier possibility that is unlikely to oc-
cur simply because of the reexamination and reengagement that this Article 
calls for.  
 Second, this Article is not a plea for or against federalization but for a co-
gent, comprehensive federal takeover code which takes into account national in-
terests, is current, and is perpetuated in such manner. Again, some portion of 
the takeover code may be federalized as a result of SEC review and reengage-
ment, but the focus should be on creating a functional national takeover code. In 
this regard, significant portions of the state code currently do regulate appropri-
                                                                                                                     
 343. For a discussion of the benefits of the Delaware system, particularly its ability to 
adjust to public developments, see Griffith & Steele, supra note 11, at 13-22. 
 344. See Steinberg, supra note 321 (outlining the positive role the SEC plays in na-
tional securities regulation).  
 345. See Banner, supra note 17, at 850 (observing that congressional action on securi-
ties regulation has largely been the product of scandal or other public furor). 
 346. See id. This is true even if the SEC acted through stock exchange rulemaking. The 
changes would likely be so significant that congressional approval would be an effective re-
quirement.   
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ately and should be maintained.347 Moreover, a reengaged SEC would channel 
the state takeover code into a greater harmony with the SEC’s desired national 
code. Any regulation by the SEC should take this into account. The issue is 
therefore one of an optimal takeover code, not federalization for its own sake.  
 Finally, federalization is arguably not an optimal norm on either a process or 
a substantive level. A judicially supervised takeover code can add value. The 
Delaware court process of case-by-case searching review is arguably not 
achievable through SEC regulation.348 Delaware fiduciary standards regulating 
the internal affairs of a corporation provide a base level of court supervision and 
regulation for takeovers that the SEC rules cannot.349 Thus, a vigorous duopoly 
appears to have potential to be a satisfactory regulator of takeovers. The preser-
vation of Delaware would arguably mitigate risks of SEC industry capture as 
well as preserve an alternative laboratory for ideas and developments, albeit one 
subject to SEC supervision and response.350 It would also allow for quicker 
variances of response; either the SEC or the Delaware courts could act.351 This 
is strong brew—a duopoly preserves the unique talents which each regulator 
can bring to bear.352  
 This is another lesson of the fourth wave. If each regulator focuses on its in-
terests, it can arguably build a more fitting, politically and economically opti-
mal takeover code.353 This appeared to be the destination of takeover regulation 
in 1985, the year of the Delaware court’s decisions in Revlon and Unocal and a 
high tide for SEC involvement. Alas, the dream went by the wayside upon the 
SEC’s subsequent withdrawal. Nonetheless, SEC regulation should take this 
collaboration into account to craft a national code which maintains space for 
state takeover regulation. The SEC will obviously maintain a check on Dela-
ware and the other states, but this trump should be one utilized only when na-
tional interests militate. 
                                                                                                                     
 347. See Griffith & Steele, supra note 11 (arguing the benefits of the Delaware corpo-
rate code).  
 348. See Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law 
Work?, 44 UCLA L. REV. 1009 (1997) (discussing the unique style of the Delaware courts’ 
writings). 
 349. See Gilson, supra note 320, at 40-42 (2002) (“Courts cannot distinguish with preci-
sion whether underperformance results from bad luck on the one hand, or bad judgment on 
the other. The business judgment rule properly serves to allocate that assessment to the 
market.”); Ehud Kamar, A Regulatory Competition Theory of Indeterminacy in Corporate 
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1908, 1939 (1998) (arguing that “[t]he competitive advantage that 
Delaware derives from legal indeterminacy may have shaped its law indirectly”). 
 350. See Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of 
Corporate Law, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1573, 1576 (2005). 
 351.  This is a natural outcome of having two focused regulators, although of course 
conflicting regulation is also a possibility. The trump available to the SEC, however, 
should alleviate and forestall this problem.  
 352. Cf. Kamar, supra note 349 (arguing for imperfect competition of suboptimal regu-
lation as a plausible intermediate regulatory structure between perfect competition and 
monopoly). 
 353. This would be accomplished through the threat and actuality of SEC intervention 
if harmonized regulation was not achieved.  
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VII.   CONCLUSION 
 Our whirlwind tour of federal takeover regulation has exploded a surround-
ing myth. The myth was that of the SEC as a currently active regulator of take-
overs. This was once fact; the SEC was the primary regulator of takeovers from 
the 1960s through to the twilight of the 1980s. But it is no longer the case; since 
1989 the SEC has largely abstained from the regulation of takeovers.  
 The consequences of this truth are manifold. In the SEC absence, federal 
takeover law has become obsolete. It oftentimes regulates incongruously, does 
not regulate important areas, or regulates in a manner inconsistent with the wel-
fare of its interested parties. Moreover, the SEC’s failure to tend the federal 
takeover code and practice of one-off rulemaking has created incoherence. 
Many takeover rules now lack justification or otherwise do not function effec-
tively in tandem with the remaining federal code. In short, there is an existing 
failure of federal takeover regulation.  
 The post-1989 abstention of the SEC has also resulted in the emergence of 
the Delaware courts as the nation’s primary takeover regulator. Delaware has 
vigorously seized this position and proceeded to erect a takeover code struc-
tured in accordance with its narrow pro-management and other self-interests. 
The consequence is a suboptimal takeover code, one that is contrary to national 
interests as well as the SEC’s traditional concerns of stockholder protection and 
decisional autonomy.  
 This all sustains a loud cry for an SEC reexamination and update of the fed-
eral takeover law, and for the SEC’s return as an active, engaged regulator of 
public takeovers. The result would not only be a forward-going, current take-
over code, but one that keeps the Delaware courts in check. This would engen-
der a more economically efficient, informed, and internally ordered national 
takeover code in the better interests of stockholders and the nation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
